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Abstract
This dissertation investigates three substantial issues in education policy. First,
it examines whether or not unobserved student heterogeneity introduces bias into
value-added models of teacher effectiveness. After developing a statistical test, the
results indicate that the omission of typically unmeasured information on noncogni-
tive skills generates statistically significant bias and results in the misclassification
of teachers according to their value-added quintile.
Next, the dissertation explores the characteristics upon which students are as-
signed to teachers within schools. In contract to prior studies that analyzed data
from limited geographic areas, this research employs a nationally-representative
data set for the first time. While the analysis largely confirms earlier studies, I
find that some of the matching documented in earlier studies, such as on prior test
scores, might be an artifact of the chosen model, and that the sorting might instead
take place on variables that are correlated with test scores.
Finally, the dissertation critically examines prior research on class size reduc-
tion in elementary grades and generates estimates of future labor market benefits
based on several later outcomes. Though estimates of labor market benefits based
on ACT scores are higher than the costs of class size reduction, estimates gener-
ated using other outcomes almost exclusively are not.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Education has played a key role in economic philosophy from the very begin-
ning. While Adam Smith, the father of modern capitalist economics, generally was
against government intervention, he believed that the government should play a
role in the promotion of education. At the same time, he demonstrated uncanny
foresight in pinpointing some of the issues that might arise. Smith found the uni-
versity salary system to be problematic, noting the disconnect between teachers’
incentives and their compensation. Given that teachers would be paid the same
amount regardless of their performance, self-interested teachers would maximize
their utility by investing as little time as possible in teaching (Smith 1776).
Over two-hundred years later, the disconnect between pay and performance still
plagues the United States’ public education system. Teachers are generally paid
according to their years of experience, license, and attained degrees, yet these
factors seem to be only loosely related to student achievement gains (Corcoran
and Goldhaber 2013). Viewed in the context of an education production function
that relates family, school, and teacher inputs to academic achievement, such an
arrangement could be viewed as economically inefficient (Hanushek 1986). One
solution to the problem may be found in value added models (VAMs), which attempt
to pinpoint exactly how much each teacher contributes to the education production
process. If such measures are found to be reliable, then teachers could be paid
according to their value. Unfortunately, the reliability of these models is still in ques-
tion. The second chapter of this dissertation contributes to the existing literature
on the topic both by providing a statistical test for bias in VAMs and by showing
that such models are biased by the omission of students’ typically unobserved
noncognitive skills.
Related to the idea of VAMs is the question of upon which characteristics stu-
dents are assigned to teachers within schools. The third chapter attempts to inves-
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tigate the possibility of purposeful sorting of students to teachers versus the null
hypothesis of random assignment. While VAMs are able to control for observed
characteristics, any systematic matching of students to teachers based on unob-
served characteristics can introduce bias into estimates, as demonstrated in the
second chapter. Thus, an understanding of the sorting process can be an im-
portant aid to further research. The ramifications of teacher-student sorting are
not limited to bias in VAM estimates, however, as they also provide insight into
race dynamics within schools, for example. Further, the existence of sorting can
cloud research on other important topics as well. If less-experienced teachers are
assigned smaller class sizes, as this chapter finds, and if new teachers are less
effective than more-experienced teachers, then the sorting based on experience
might confound analyses of class size reduction.
Unobserved teacher differences are only one reason why studying class size
reduction can be difficult. Other studies have noted a decrease in teacher quality
corresponding to class size reduction initiatives, as the additional teachers schools
must hire are typically less effective than the teachers they already employ (Jepsen
and Rivkin 2009). Due in part to related problems, researchers have turned to the
only modern randomized class size experiment, and have used the data to gener-
ally conclude that the labor market benefits of class size outweigh the cost. How-
ever, the fourth chapter of the dissertation suggests that such a conclusion may
have been drawn in haste. Labor market benefit estimates only exceed the cost
of the intervention when generated using test scores as the measured outcome,
and generally under relatively liberal assumptions. When using other outcomes
to generate benefit estimates, or when operating under stricter assumptions, the
estimated benefits are exclusively lower than the costs.
Together, the three studies that comprise this dissertation address a number of
3
crucial questions in education research. Hopefully, these investigations will allevi-
ate the concerns noted by Smith so long ago, and lead to an improved educational
system which can better provide the learning experience that students deserve.
4
Chapter 2
Do Unobserved Noncognitive Skills Invalidate
Value-Added Measures of Teacher Effectiveness?
5
Introduction
Value-added models (VAMs) have come to be looked at as a key analytical
tool for improving educational outcomes. Staiger and Rockoff (2010), for exam-
ple, propose that teachers should be assessed by value-added models for a few
years and then retained or not based partially on this measure of their perfor-
mance. Both Hanushek (2011) and Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013) suggest
extremely large future labor market gains stemming from the replacement of the
lowest-performing teachers. Given the high-stakes nature of VAM estimates, their
accuracy is paramount. How could VAM estimates be utilized if they are in fact
systematically biased by unobserved student information?
This paper adds to a growing empirical literature uncovering evidence that VAM
estimates may be biased. Rothstein (2009) found that current test score gains
are correlated with future teacher assignment, a relationship that cannot be causal
and, in Rothstein’s view, is indicative of bias. Subsequent research has tempered
this conclusion, with Goldhaber and Chaplin (2011) noting that Rothstein’s finding
doesn’t necessarily imply bias, and that bias only exists if the omitted variables are
correlated with cognitive achievement and teacher assignment after conditioning
on the observed variables.
While these earlier works suggest that bias might exist, no studies to this point
have been able to show whether or not bias is actually present in VAM estimates,
or which omitted variables serve as the culprits. The only relevant inquiry (Chetty,
Friedman, and Rockoff 2013) found no substantial bias from typically-unobserved
parental characteristics, but they tested just a small fraction of the variables which
could be conditionally correlated with future achievement and only proxy for the
student characteristics that are potentially problematic. Current knowledge about
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the extent of bias resulting from unobserved characteristics is thus somewhat lim-
ited, and researchers therefore have an insufficient understanding of how accurate
VAMs actually are.
Complicating the search for bias is the absence of an appropriate statistical
method which would allow researchers to test a null hypothesis that VAM esti-
mates (or any other coefficients) are not subject to omitted variable bias. Stated
differently, there appears to be no suitable test for whether or not multiple coeffi-
cient estimates are sufficiently unaffected by the presence of a given variable. The
lack of such a test may be especially surprising when one considers that a large
proportion of observational studies argue that results are robust to unobserved
variables based on a parameter stability heuristic. If coefficient estimates move by
only a small amount when an additional control is added, researchers often take
this as a sign, under the proportional selection assumption, that the coefficient es-
timates are likewise unaffected by the exclusion of other, unobserved covariates
(Oster 2013). On the other hand, if coefficients demonstrate more than a small
amount of movement as further variables are added to the model, this could be
construed as indicating that results are not robust to unobserved heterogeneity.
The problem with the use of this heuristic is that it is not clear what constitutes a
small amount, and what differentiates it from being statistically significant.
This study considers the question of whether or not VAM estimates are robust
to unobserved student heterogeneity. Using ECLS-K (Early Childhood Longitudi-
nal Study Kindergarten Class of 1998-99) data, it contributes to the literature by
demonstrating that the omission of noncognitive scores introduces substantial bias
into VAM estimates. Additionally, a permutation test for omitted variable bias is
developed and utilized to show that the bias is in fact statistically significant. The
permutation test serves as a substantial methodological contribution, as it can be
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used by practitioners to assess parameter stability and therefore robustness to un-
observed information in a way that is much more scientific than the current use
of heuristics. Finally, this analysis shows that a failure to account for typically-
unobserved noncognitive scores leads to VAM estimates that are problematically
inaccurate, incorrectly identifying teachers according to their value-added quintile
at a rate of about 11.5%. Noting that noncognitive skills are only a portion of the
student characteristics that might be sources of unobserved heterogeneity, and in
light of the proportional selection assumption, the results raise serious concerns
about the validity of VAM estimates.
This paper begins with a review of the literature before providing a conceptual
framework of the conditions under which VAM estimates are biased. The follow-
ing section empirically examines whether or not typically-unobserved noncognitive
scores satisfy these conditions, finding that students’ scores on an attribute de-
scribed as ”Approaches to Learning” is conditionally correlated with both teacher
assignment and cognitive achievement. Then, a permutation test is developed and
the identified bias is assessed with respect to its statistical significance. The prac-
tical implications of the bias are subsequently explored, with an examination of
how much the bias affects the identification of the best and worst teachers, before
concluding with a discussion of the results.
Previous Literature
The potential for bias due to unobserved student characteristics is greatly con-
cerning when one considers the possible application of VAM estimates. Though
researchers typically do not recommend making personnel decisions solely on a
teacher’s measured value-added, recent studies have pointed to the use of value-
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added models in conjunction with other assessments to weed out low-performing
teachers (Goldhaber and Hansen 2010, Gordon, Kane, and Staiger 2006, Staiger
and Rockoff 2010). As mentioned earlier, estimates of labor market benefits in
terms of higher future earnings of students resulting from the enaction of these
policies suggest very large returns (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2013, Hanushek
2011).
If teacher retention policies based on VAM estimates are implemented, though,
then value-added models must be sufficiently accurate, and it isn’t clear whether
this is the case. In fact, according to Corcoran and Goldhaber (2013), most re-
searchers would agree that VAM estimates suffer from measurable bias. Their
belief is driven primarily by a series of papers beginning with Rothstein (2009),
who empirically demonstrated that future teacher assignments can predict current
test score gains. Since a causal relationship between the quality of future teachers
and current score gains is impossible, Rothstein’s finding could indicate that stu-
dents are assigned to subsequent teachers based on unobserved characteristics.
Thus, Rothstein concludes that value-added estimates may be biased.
Later papers suggest that Rothstein’s conclusion should perhaps have been a
bit more nuanced. Koedel and Betts (2011) generally confirmed Rothstein’s find-
ings, but also noted that such bias can be greatly reduced by observing teachers
over several waves of students. Indeed, after doing so, they find no evidence of
bias. Kinsler (2012) finds that Rothstein’s test performs poorly in small samples
and that there is little evidence of tracking when accounting for sample size and
allowing teacher effects to persist into later years. Goldhaber and Chaplin (2011)
point out that Rothstein’s falsification test in fact only detects tracking, which may
not necessarily introduce bias unless there are omitted variables that are correlated
with cognitive achievement and teacher assignment, conditional upon observed
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covariates.
Perhaps the most relevant search for bias from unobservables is found in Chetty,
Friedman, and Rockoff (2013). They include a set of typically-unobserved parental
variables, such as mother’s age at the child’s birth and dummy variables for 401(k)
contributions and home ownership, as predictors of test scores. The inclusion of
the additional variables did not reveal any significant bias. As discussed previously,
though, the additional variables they considered merely proxy for unobserved stu-
dent information and make up only a small percent of typically-unobserved charac-
teristics. Thus, while Rothstein’s testing for the effect of future teachers on current
gains suggests the potential for bias, there has been little subsequent evidence
that the bias exists, or which unobserved variables might cause it.
One potential source of bias that has yet to be explored lies in noncognitive
skills, such as self-discipline, persistence (Heckman 2000), attentiveness, temper
control, and friendship formation. Several types of noncognitive skills have been
demonstrated to be related to cognitive achievement. Swartz and Walker (1984)
show that certain noncognitive abilities measured in kindergarten, such as inter-
personal skills, are related to scores on the California Achievement Test. Simi-
larly, Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber (1993) find that a child’s attentiveness and
participation in classroom activities are predictors of future cognitive achievement
gains. Other studies demonstrate that noncognitive skills are related to cognitive
test scores even after controlling for prior achievement (McClelland, Morrison, and
Holms 2000) or demographic characteristics (Fantuzzo et al. 2007, McClelland et
al. 2007). Utilizing ECLS-K data, Li-Grining et al. (2010) show that the Approaches
to Learning skill is an important factor in determining a student’s academic trajec-
tory.
Even if noncognitive skills do predict cognitive gains after conditioning on ob-
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served student characteristic, Goldhaber and Chaplin explain that these skills would
also have to be correlated with teacher assignment in order to bias VAM estimates.
Unfortunately, there is suggestive evidence that this may be the case. While they
didn’t control for observed student characteristics, Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille
(2013) demonstrate that students are matched to teachers based on prior behav-
ior, which is often thought to be correlated with noncognitive ability. Additionally,
Neidell and Waldfogel (2010) find evidence that the noncognitive scores in the
ECLS-K data jointly predict a student’s future teacher assignments. Thus, it is cer-
tainly plausible that noncognitive skills fulfill Goldhaber and Chaplin’s requirements
for bias.
Even in light of the potential for bias due to noncognitive scores or other unob-
served student characteristics, Corcoran and Goldhaber (2013) argue that VAMs
are still useful. Given the current body of research, they believe that the most
important question at this point is whether or not VAMs are an improvement over
other measures such as observational assessments by principals. Developing an
answer to this question requires an examination of the sources and magnitude of
bias in VAM estimates, precisely what this paper intends to do.
Data
Data from the ECLS-K will be used in this endeavor. Provided by the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES), the ECLS-K is a nationally representa-
tive sample of over 21,000 students who entered kindergarten in the fall of 1998
(Tourangeau et al. 2009). Approximately 1,000 schools were included in the sam-
ple, resulting in an average sample of around 21 students per school. About 8
students were sampled per classroom in kindergarten, though this figure drops to
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just under 5 by the end of first grade. Weights are provided in the data to account
for sampling variability, although researchers have noted that their estimates do
not appear to be substantially affected by the use or choice of weight.1 For the
sake of simplicity with respect to the permutation exercises that follow, weights are
not used in this analysis.
Information such as demographic characteristics, family background, subjective
assessments, test scores, and school characteristics was gathered from teachers,
parents, and administrators in the fall of kindergarten and the spring of kinder-
garten, 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 8th grade. However, the gaps between later grades limit
this analysis to only the kindergarten and first grade year, as assessments from
two or three years earlier do not serve as good baseline test scores in value added
models. Further, in later grades the number of students per surveyed teacher is
often only one or two, making it impossible to develop reliable VAM estimates for
each teacher.
A particularly problematic aspect of the ECLS-K sample as it relates to this
analysis is the prevalence of missing data. Only 15,526 students have reading
and math scores recorded both for the spring of kindergarten and spring of first
grade, and other variables used in the analysis contain missing values as well. One
approach to dealing with this issue would be to replace missing values with school
or sample means. However, since analyses will be conducted using school-level
fixed effects, such a solution would attenuate coefficient estimates toward zero.
Making the situation even more troubling is the fact that the data are not miss-
ing at random. Students with missing test scores at the end of Kindergarten or first
grade are substantially weaker, as measured by their fall kindergarten scores, than
1Fryer and Levitt (2004) also note that their estimates are not sensitive to the choice of weights
or to weighting at all.
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are students with valid scores in those waves. Therefore, if missing test scores
were replaced with classroom means, then the replaced values would likely be ar-
tificially high. Linear predictions of later test scores based on the fall kindergarten
score and other observed characteristics would also obscure test score gains be-
tween the spring of Kindergarden and spring of 1st grade, since they would be
based off of the same underlying information. Thus, this study follows earlier re-
search (Fryer and Levitt 2004, Claessens, Duncan, and Engel 2009) by simply
dropping affected cases. The end result is an effective sample size of approxi-
mately 11,500 students.
Of special interest in this study are the well-validated measures of noncognitive
skills offered in the ECLS-K data. Noncognitive scores are provided in five areas:
Approaches to Learning, Externalizing Problem Behaviors, Internalizing Problem
Behaviors, Interpersonal Skills, and Self-Control. While each score certainly mea-
sures the respective skill with error, they have been employed in several earlier ar-
ticles (see Claessens, Duncan, and Engel 2009, Downey and Pribesh 2004, Finn
and Pannozzo 2004, Hair et al. 2006, Ready et al. 2005). Neidell and Waldfogel
(2010) find large and signficant behavioral peer effects when using the External-
izing Problem Behaviors score, for example. These scores will be utilized in this
study as measures of the typically-unobserved noncognitive skills that might bias
VAM estimates.
Theoretical Framework
Adapted from Hanushek and Rivkin (2010), Dieterle et al. (2012), and Gold-
haber and Chaplin (2011), suppose the value added model takes the form of
Ait = µ+ Sit + θAi(t−1) +Xitγ + Uitδ +
∑
τjitβj + εit (1)
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In the case above, Ait and Ai(t−1) are measures of student achievement in year
t and t-1, respectively, Sit is a school effect, and µ is both the intercept and the
value added of the omitted teacher. Xit are observed characteristics, while Uit
are typically-unobserved characteristics. θ, γ, and δ are unknown, and εit is a
stochastic error term. τjit is a dummy variable which indicates whether or not
student i was assigned to teacher j at time t, and βj would be interpreted as a
specific teacher’s value added, relative to the omitted teacher.
Assuming that the typically-unobserved variables cannot be included in the
analysis, the actual model used for estimation is
Ait = µ + Sit + θAi(t−1) + Xitγ +
∑
τjitβj + εit
εit ≡ Uitδ + uit
If Uit is a linear function of Xit and Ai(t−1), such that
Uitδ = α1Ai(t−1) + α2Xit + vit
where vit is independently and identically distributed according to a normal dis-
tribution, then this is of little importance. The value-added model can be written
as
Ait = µ + Sit + (1 + α1δ )θAi(t−1) + (1 +
α2
δ
)Xitγ +
∑
τjitβj + it
This, of course, would not affect regression estimates, since Xit and Ai(t−1) are
subject only to linear transformations. On the other hand, it may be the case that Uit
is not a linear function of lagged achievement and observed characteristics, which
could, as Goldhaber and Chaplin point out, be problematic. As they demonstrate,
though, while the presence of Uit would bias some regression estimates, it wouldn’t
necessarily introduce bias into estimates of teacher value-added, βj.
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Adapting their work to the notation in this analysis, we can define the omitted
variable bias as
Bias(βˆj) = E(βˆj)− βj = δpije (2)
where pije is the coefficient on τjit obtained from regressing Uit on all of the other
independent variables in Equation 1 except εit. They then note that
pije = Cov(U
∗
it, τ
∗
jit)/V ar(τ
∗
jit)
2 (3)
where U∗it and τ ∗jit “are the conditional values of [Uit] and [τjit] that exist after con-
trolling for other variables in the model.” (Goldhaber and Chaplin 2011, p.5-6)3 In
other words, the starred terms are the residuals found after regressing the respec-
tive unobserved variable on all of the other right-hand side variables in Equation
1.
Equation 2 demonstrates that bias exists only if δ and pije are both nonzero. The
δ coefficient,
δ = Cov(A∗it,U
∗
it)/V ar(U
∗
it) (4)
is nonzero if Uit is not a linear function of Xit and Ait, and if Uit is correlated with
Ait after conditioning upon all of the other observed variables. Stated differently,
Uit must share a relationship with Ait that cannot be explained by the other co-
variates. pije is nonzero only if Uit is correlated with τjit after conditioning upon
the remaining control variables. In other words, if the unobserved characteristics
are not a linear function of the observed characteristics and lagged achievement,
if Uit explains Ait in a way not captured by the other variables, and if Uit is condi-
tionally correlated with teacher assignment, then the unobservables will bias VAM
2See the footnote to page 5 in Goldhaber and Chaplin (2011).
3Goldhaber and Chaplin use ovig in place of Uit and τt,i,g in place of τjit.
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estimates (Goldhaber and Chaplin 2011).
Of course, researchers have been mindful of the fact that unobserved charac-
teristics could pose challenging for VAM estimation and have come up with meth-
ods to eliminate such problems. Perhaps the most popular of these is the use of
student-level fixed effects, which has been employed in several recent papers in-
cluding Harris and Sass (2006) and Koedel and Betts (2007, 2011). One problem
that arises from this technique is that it generates a systematic relationship be-
tween the first-differenced error term and the lagged score gain (Koedel and Betts
2011). Researchers (Harris and Sass 2006, Koedel 2009, Koedel and Betts 2007,
2011) solve this problem by instrumenting for the lagged test score gains with the
second lagged test score, as in Anderson and Hsiao (1981), via 2SLS (Koedel and
Betts 2011).
While a theoretically-sound technique, it isn’t perfect in its practical application.
First, Kane and Staiger (2008) find that including student fixed effects results in
VAM estimates that are attenuated toward zero. Perhaps even more important for
an analysis of early grades, the requirement of a second-lagged test score makes
it difficult or impossible to accurately assess kindergarten and first grade teachers,
as each student might not have been assessed twice prior to teacher assignment.
Additionally, districts might not have twice-lagged test scores for students mov-
ing into their district, increasing the likelihood that mobile students are left out of
teacher assessments. Thus, it is important to understand the prospects for bias
outside of the student fixed effects solution, too.
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Do Typically-Unobserved Noncognitive Skills Bias Estimates of
Teacher Effects?
The analysis begins by investigating whether or not noncognitive scores satisfy
the conditions for bias laid out by Goldhaber and Chaplin. Doing so consists of es-
timating both δ and pije so as to determine if their product is nonzero. The first step
involves regressing composite test scores, constructed by averaging standardized
reading and math scores, on lagged composite test scores, a school fixed effect, a
vector of k lagged noncognitive scores, and dummy variables indicating gender, mi-
nority status, and free lunch recipiency. Only students who did not switch schools
between kindergarten and first grade are considered, given the reduced amount
of information schools would have about new students for the purpose of teacher
assignment. Thus, the school fixed effect joins the female and minority indicators
as constant across time.
Ait = ω0 + ω1Ai(t−1) + ω2Femalei + ω3Minorityi + ω4Lunchit+∑
ωpSi +
∑
τjitβj +
∑
NCki(t−1)δk + eit
(5)
In most administrative data sets, noncognitive scores are unobserved and so
neither δ nor βj (conditional upon noncognitive scores) could be observed. In this
case, however, the typically-unobserved information is actually present in the se-
lected data set. Because the noncognitive scores are observed, the δ’s needed to
estimate the bias from each individual noncognitive score are then simply the δk’s
in the model above. The model was estimated via Ordinary Least Squares in order
to find the δ’s of interest.
Results, with the estimated teacher effects omitted, are given in Table 2.1. Most
of the coefficients on noncognitive scores are not statistically different from zero,
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but the coefficient on the Approaches to Learning score is large and significant.
The observed relationship is sensible given what the Approaches to Learning score
measures. According to Tourangeau et al. (2009), it is comprised of teachers’
ratings of students in six areas, including how eager a student is to learn new
things and how well a student pays attention in class. The results demonstrate that
noncognitive skills in this area predict achievement in a way not captured by the
other control variables.
Finding pije is similarly straightforward, as each teacher’s pikje is βjk, the coeffi-
cient on τjit when an individual noncognitive score k is regressed on all of the other
independent variables, including the other noncognitive scores.
NCki(t−1) = ζ0 + ζ1Ai(t−1) + ζ2Femalei + ζ3Minorityi + ζ4Lunchit+∑
ζpSi +
∑
τjitβjk +
∑
NC∼ki(t−1)δ∼k + eit
(6)
After estimating pikje for each teacher, the estimated bias from each noncognitive
score is calculated as the product of δk and pikje, and overall bias is constructed by
summing the individual components.
Biasjk = δkpikje (7)
Biasj =
∑
k
δkpikje (8)
Summary statistics for the observed bias from each noncognitive score and for the
total bias are given in Table 2.2. In general, the bias is centered around zero, and
the standard deviations are small, indicating that most of the noncognitive scores
do not bias VAM estimates when they are left out of the model. On the other hand,
there appears to be substantial bias generated by the omission of the Approaches
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to Learning score, and the bias from this variable clearly drives estimates of the
combined bias from all noncognitive scores.
This finding is compelling. The δk = 0.129 (0.011) for Approaches to Learning
was large and positive. Students with higher scores perform better on standardized
tests, even after controlling for other factors. Combined with pikje, the presence
of measurable bias shows that some teachers are assigned students with higher
Approaches to Learning scores, and VAM estimates for these teachers are biased
upwards. These teachers are matched to students who are more eager to learn
and these teachers have their value-added overestimated when using the typical
model. Other teachers are assigned students who are less eager to learn, and
their value-added is biased down. This is perhaps the first confirmed example
of a single student characteristic that generates bias in conventional value-added
estimates.
Based on Rothstein’s finding that including additional test scores from earlier
years in the value-added model could eliminate much of the bias he observed,
one potential solution to the bias problem identified here may also be found in
adding extra lagged test scores. While the inclusion of an additional lag is often
precluded by data limitations, and can make it impossible to evaluate kindergarten
and first grade teachers in many schools, it is possible in this instance. Students in
the ECLS-K sample were assessed in both the fall and spring of the kindergarten
year, and so the fall score can be added to determine whether or not its inclusion
eliminates all or part of the bias.
Since the bias results nearly entirely from the omission of the Approaches to
Learning score, the process of identifying bias was carried out using just that score,
both with and without an additional lag. That is, Equation 5 was modified and es-
timated separately as both Equations 9 and 10, where Li(t−1) is the lagged Ap-
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proaches to Learning score.
Ait = ω0 + ω1Ai(t−1) + ω2Femalei + ω3Minorityi + ω4Lunchit+∑
ωpSi +
∑
τjitβj + Li(t−1)δL + eit
(9)
Ait = ω0 + ω1Ai(t−1) + ω2Ai(t−2) + ω3Femalei + ω4Minorityi+
ω5Lunchit +
∑
ωpSi +
∑
τjitβj + Li(t−1)δL + eit
(10)
Table 2.3 offers regression results for Equation 9, while Table 2.4 provides re-
sults for Equation 10. In both cases, the coefficient on the Approaches to Learning
score is statistically significant. The inclusion of the extra lag pushes the coefficient
downward from .120 to .115, suggesting that some of the bias might be eliminated.
It may also be the case that the teacher assignment based on the Approaches to
Learning score may be somewhat mitigated when assignment on an additional lag
is accounted for, and so further investigation of the bias is merited.
Table 2.5 provides summary statistics for the estimated bias both with and with-
out the additional lag, while only considering bias stemming from the Approaches
to Learning score. Though summary statistics such as the standard error, mini-
mum, and maximum bias seem to indicate that the bias is reduced when the sec-
ond lagged test score is added, the bias is far from eliminated. It is plausible that
adding further lags would further reduce the bias, but the lack of a third lagged test
score renders this option impossible in the ECLS-K data, and may be impractical
in practice.
While the finding that VAM estimates are biased when the Approaches to Learn-
ing score is omitted is interesting, the magnitude of the bias is also important. Fig-
ure 1 is a histogram of the bias from the omission of the Approaches to Learning
score for all teachers. The story it tells is both comforting and concerning at the
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same time. For most teachers, the bias is relatively minor. About 47% of teachers
show bias that is between -.05 and .05 standard deviations of student achievement.
On the other hand, estimates for 15.7% of teachers exhibit bias greater than .1 in
magnitude.
It may also be informative to explore how the bias varies with a teacher’s es-
timated value-added. Figure 2 is a scatter plot with Vconv, the conventional value-
added measure which does not include the Approaches to Learning score, on
the X-axis, and the bias resulting from the omission of the Approaches to Learn-
ing score on the Y-axis. If Vconv was approximately unbiased, then the fitted line
would be parallel to the X-axis. The upward slope of the line instead indicates
that teachers evaluated favorably by the conventional measure have their value
overestimated due to the bias. On the other hand, teachers evaluated unfavorably
have their value underestimated. This provides further evidence that, while Vconv
may measure teacher effectiveness in a manner that is close enough for many
teachers, it may result in some teachers being evaluated with error.
Still, neither summary statistics nor graphs provide evidence of statistical sig-
nificance. In this case, such a test would be useful to distinguish the identified
bias from random noise. Unfortunately, several aspects of the bias rule out the
use of typical tests. Most notably, this study is interested in bias across several
teacher dummy variables, while existing tests only allow for the testing of one vari-
able at a time4. Further, while the rankings of teachers differ based on inclusion of
noncognitive scores, the distributions of VAM estimates generated both with and
without these scores are essentially the same. The common mean and distribu-
tion rule out conventional t- and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, while the zero-sum
nature of the bias renders useless such options as the paired t-, Mann-Whitney,
4See MacKinnon et al. (2002) for a summary for various methods.
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and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Various rank statistics might be appropriate, but
are not illuminating without a valid counterfactual. That is, computing a rank statis-
tic is not helpful without knowing what the statistic would have been if noncognitive
scores were not correlated with achievement and teacher assignment.
A Permutation Test for Omitted Variable Bias
The problem, then, set in the context of a hypothesis test, is that no known test
is able to reject the null hypothesis:
H0 :
∏
j
δkpikje = 0 (11)
Given the generally-accepted requirement of statistical significance for causal con-
clusions, the lack of a usable test serves as a substantial obstacle.
In order to reject H0 at some significance level α, a method of determining
a p-value must be developed. To do so, it is helpful to think of the p-value as
the likelihood that bias as extreme as that observed in the data would have been
observed if H0 was actually true. If noncognitive scores were randomly assigned
to students after conditioning on observed student covariates, then
E[
∏
j
δkpikje|X] = 0. (12)
The p-value can thus be considered to be the probability of observing such extreme
bias under conditionally-random assignment.
Of course, conditionally-random assignment cannot be carried out in this case,
as noncognitive scores simply cannot be assigned in this manner to students. For-
tunately, earlier research points at permutation tests as a potential solution. Origi-
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nating with Neyman (1923) and Fisher (1935), their theoretical basis is well estab-
lished (Brown and Maritz 1982, Kempthorne 1952, Scheffe´ 1959). At that time, a
lack of technology prevented their immediate application. With the advent of com-
puters, though, researchers began investigating the use of permutation tests in
linear regression (Gail, Tan and Piantadosi 1988, Levin and Robbins 1983, Manly
1991, Oja 1987, Welch 1990). To motivate the intuition behind a permutation test,
a simple example from Kennedy (1995) will be used. Consider a linear regression
that takes the following form:
Y = B0 + B1X + e
Suppose Y is income and X is gender, and suppose that one wishes to ex-
amine the relationship between gender and income among 20 individuals who are
otherwise alike in every way. It is not possible to randomly assign the treatment of
male or female to individuals, just as it is not possible to randomly assign noncog-
nitive scores to students. However, it is possible to randomly shuffle the labels of
male and female across cases under the null hypothesis that B1 = 0, providing the
error terms are homoscedastic and thus exchangeable. In carrying out this shuf-
fling several times, a permutation test provides a multiple data sets as if gender
was randomly assigned.
Unfortunately, permutation tests become more complicated in multiple regres-
sion. Again adapted from Kennedy, consider the case when education also varies
across respondents, with Z serving as a dummy variable indicating whether or not
the individual has a high school degree.
Y = B0 +B1X1 +B2X2 +B3Z + e (13)
Now, X1 can no longer be permuted, as the collinearity between X1, X2 and Z
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would no longer be maintained. Further, error terms would no longer be exchange-
able, since it cannot be assumed that the variance of e is the same across highly
educated and less educated individuals. Instead, values can only be permuted
within groups, as in Kempthorne.
The case of a continuous regressor then poses a significant challenge, since
there are no groups among which permuting is permissible. Several solutions to
this problem are present in the research, with Kennedy providing an excellent sum-
mary of the various options. Perhaps the most well-received is a method of shuf-
fling residuals, outlined in Beaton (1978) and Freedman and Lane (1983). Consider
again Equation 9, but suppose that both X1 and Z are now continuous predictors.
Their method consists of regressing Y on X2 and Z, computing residuals, random-
izing the residuals across individuals and then adding them to the predicted values
of Y . The modified Y is then regressed on X1, X2, and Z to provide an estimate of
B1 as if X1 was randomly assigned, conditional upon X2 and Z.
Kennedy provides another, similar solution. Y and X1 are independently re-
gressed on X2 and Z before estimating the residuals, Y ∗ and X∗1 . Y ∗ is randomly
shuffled to create Y ∗m, the residualized Y vector under permutation m, before re-
gressing Y ∗m on X∗1 to estimate B1. Kennedy shows that this method produces
an estimate of B1 that is identical to the estimate found using the procedure out-
lined by Freedman and Lane. Anderson and Robinson (2001) note that Kennedy’s
method is not completely equivalent to Freedman and Lane’s, as the correlation
coefficients vary by procedure, but confirm that both methods produce identical
estimates of partial regression coefficients.
For an exact test of the statistical significance of B1, estimates of Bm1 are to be
found under all M permutations of Y ∗. A simple t-statistic, tm, is then calculated
for each Bm1 . Constructing the p-value consists of counting h, the number of per-
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mutations in which tm exceeds t, the t-statistic found using the unpermuted data,
and then dividing by the total number of permutations. Noting that the unpermuted
case must also be included in the denominator, the p-value of interest is
p = h
M+1
If p < α, the null hypothesis that B1=0 can be rejected. Of course, given a
large number of cases and thus a very large number of permutations, carrying
out an exact test may be infeasible. Instead, past empirical work has generally
used 1,000 permutations (Kim, Nelson, and Startz 1991, McQueen 1992), as other
studies have indicated that 1,000-10,000 permutations should be sufficient for a
powerful, if still approximate, test (Dwass 1957, Keller-McNulty and Higgins 1987,
Manly 1991).
The permutation test I develop for statistically significant bias is a basic exten-
sion of the methods proposed by Kennedy and others. Suppose now that Z is
often unobserved, and one wishes to test whether or not the omission of Z biases
estimates of B1. The estimated bias for B1 can be written as
Bias(Bˆ1) = E(Bˆ1) - B1 = B3 pi1
Z = pi0 + pi1X1 + pi2X2 + e
B3 =
Cov(Z∗1,2,Y ∗1,2)
V ar(Z∗1,2)
pi1 =
Cov(Z∗2,X∗1 )
V ar(X∗1 )
=⇒ Bias(Bˆ1) = Cov(Z∗1,2,Y ∗1,2)V ar(Z∗1,2) Cov(Z
∗2,X∗1 )
V ar(X∗1 )
Note that Z∗1,2 6= Z∗2. Z∗1,2 is comprised of the residuals found after regressing
Z on X1 and X2, while Z∗2 consists of the residuals generated after regressing Z
on only X2.
Under the null hypothesis that Bias(Bˆ1) = 0, one of the following must be true:
B3=0, or pi1=0, or both B3 = 0 and pi1 = 0. For simplicity, the case of B3=0 is
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considered. A measure of bias that would be observed if the null hypothesis in fact
holds true is then
Bias(Bˆm1 ) = Bm3 pi1 =
Cov(Z∗1,2,Y ∗1,2m)
V ar(Z∗1,2)
Cov(Z∗2,X∗1 )
V ar(X∗1 )
Y and Z are both independently regressed on X1 and X2, and the residualized
versions of each, Y ∗1,2 and Z∗1,2, are estimated. Y ∗1,2 is randomly shuffled and
regressed on Z∗1,2 to generate an estimate of Bm3 .
Given the counterfactual provided by each permutation, the only necessity that
remains for an appropriate test is a suitable test statistic. For a product of coeffi-
cients Bpi, prior studies (MacKinnon et al. 2002, Sobel 1982) have noted that the
t-statistic can be calculated as
t = Bpi√
B2σ2pi+pi
2σ2B+σ
2
piσ
2
B
where the denominator is the standard error of the second order Taylor series
approximation of Bpi (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). σ2piσ2B is typically omitted both
because it doesn’t appear when using the first order delta method to find the stan-
dard error (Sobel 1982) and because it is generally very small (Baron and Kenny
1986, MacKinnon and Dwyer 1993). Of course, both σ2pi and σ2B are unknown, and
so their estimates are used in their place. As before, an approximate p-value can
be found by estimating t for each permutation and calculating the proportion of per-
mutations in which tm exceeds t, and the null hypothesis of no bias can be rejected
if p < α. Rejecting the null hypothesis is equivalent to finding that B1 moves by a
significant amount when Z is added as a control, and in this way the permutation
test for omitted variable bias functions as a test for parameter stability as well.
The new method is demonstrated as a test only of the bias stemming from the
Approaches to Learning score, as this score was responsible for the vast majority
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of the overall identified bias. First, Ait is regressed on all of the typically-observed
right-hand side variables in Equation 3, and the residual, A∗it, is estimated. Then,
L∗i(t−1), the residualized Approaches to Learning score, is estimated after regress-
ing the score on the same typically-observed right-hand side variables. A∗it is then
shuffled to obtain A∗mit , which is regressed on L∗i(t−1). Finally, an estimate of bias in
βj from the Approaches to Learning score under permutation m can be written as
BiasmjL = δmL piL(je)
The expression above gives an estimate of bias as if the null hypothesis, BiasjL
= 0, is true. In the special case of VAM estimates, we are interested not in whether
one teacher’s estimate is significantly biased, as the general argument would test,
but in whether or not VAM estimates are biased across all teachers. In other words,
the hypothesis of interest is that the sum of bias across all teachers is zero. Treat-
ing the t-value as a standardized distance, and considering that a greater distance
corresponds to more bias, I argue that the mean squared t-statistic, t¯2, is an ap-
propriate test statistic in this instance. The mean squared t-statistic thus reflects
the mean squared standardized error between the VAM estimates with the Ap-
proaches to Learning score and the VAM estimates without the Approaches to
Learning score.
If h is now the number of times out of M that t¯2m, the t¯2 estimated under per-
mutation, is larger than the t¯2 observed in the data, then the p-value is the same
as before.
p = h
M+1
The t¯2 derived from the actual data was approximately 1.168. None of the 1000
permutations which were carried out resulted in t¯2 exceeding 1.168, meaning that
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the p-value of interest was exactly zero. The null hypothesis that VAM estimates are
not biased by the omission of the Approaches to Learning score can be rejected.
In other words, the identified bias is statistically significant.
How does Omitting Approaches to Learning Result in Misclas-
sification of Teachers?
Though it has been demonstrated that unobserved noncognitive scores bias
VAM estimates in a manner that is statistically significant, it isn’t yet clear how
much such bias actually matters from a practical perspective. The usefulness of
value-added models depends on their ability to correctly identify the best and worst
teachers so that administrators can accurately determine which teachers should
be promoted and which teachers should be fired. Thus, researchers may be in-
terested not just in whether any bias exists but whether or not the bias causes
typical value-added models to incorrectly classify teachers according to their VAM
estimate.
The most obvious way to investigate the correct classification rate of VAM esti-
mates when noncognitive scores are omitted is to simply compare estimates from
models including the Approaches to Learning Score, VL, to estimates from models
in which such scores were left out, Vconv. Suppose that an administrator wanted to
classify teachers into five equally-sized groups, based on their VAM estimates, for
tenure or termination purposes. Teachers would be divided into five quintiles, with
the least effective teachers being assigned to the lowest quintile and the most ef-
fective teachers assigned to the highest. Of interest is whether or not each teacher
is assigned to the same quintile regardless of whether VL or Vconv was used.
Table 2.6 shows how teachers classified according to Vconv would have been
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classified had the Approaches to Learning score been controlled for. For example,
92% of those teachers identified as the worst teachers were actually the least
effective as measured by VL. According to Table 2.6, if a school district of 500
teachers decided to fire the 100 lowest performing teachers, then about 8 of those
terminations would be unjust. Overall, about 12.3% of all teachers are classified
into the wrong quintile when Vconv is utilized.
Taking these results at face value may be shortsighted, however. One of the key
limitations of this analysis is the exceedingly small sample size within classrooms.
As mentioned earlier, the mean number of sampled students per classroom by
the end of second grade is only about five. To illustrate the effect that the small
sample size could have on correct classification rates, consider a classroom of
twenty students. Each student has an Approaches to Learning score which is not
observed, but can be predicted by a linear function of typically-observed variables,
subject to some error. Naturally, the expectation of the function would be the true
Approaches to Learning score, providing the error term was independently and
identically distributed according to a mean-zero normal distribution. Roughly half
of the students would be expected to have their score underestimated, while it
would be expected that the score would be overestimated for the other half. Now
suppose teachers are typically assigned to the incorrect quintile if at least three-
fourths of their students have their score overestimated or if at least three-fourths
have their score underestimated. The probability of assignment to an incorrect
quintile is then
2
20∑
k=15
(20!)
k!(20− k)(.5
k)(.520−k) ≈ .0414 (14)
However, if only four students in the classroom are sampled, the probability be-
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comes
2
4∑
k=3
(4!)
k!(4− k)(.5
k)(.54−k) = .625 (15)
Clearly, then, misclassification could occur at an alarming rate if the sample size is
small and if the typically-observed variables predict noncognitive scores with error.
Rather than completely discounting the incorrect classifications demonstrated
in Table 2.6, though, they should instead be compared to error rates that would be
observed if no bias existed. θobs can be defined as the empirical error rate, while
θunb is the error rate that would be expected if the Approaches to Learning score
did not bias VAM estimates. The amount of error due to bias is then
θ̂bias = θ̂obs − θ̂unb (16)
The process of estimating θunb is straightforward given the earlier exploration of
permutations tests. First, note that
VL = Vconv - δLpi(L)je
As before, VL is the estimate of teacher value added when the Approaches
to Learning score is included in the linear regress. VL can thus be estimated by
finding Vconv and subtracting the estimated bias from it. Under the null hypothesis
that estimates of Vconv are unbiased, δLpiL(je) = 0. Thus, θunb is the error rate when
VL is estimated according to
V mL = Vconv - δmL piL(je)
Teachers were placed into a quintile according to V mL , and this quintile was
compared to the quintile they were classified into using Vconv. The error rate, θ̂unb,
was calculated as the percent of teachers placed into a given quintile by Vconv who
30
were placed into a different quintile using the permuted data. This process was
repeated 1000 times in order to construct a mean error rate and a 95% confidence
interval, which are provided by quintile in Table 2.7.
Mean error rates using V mL vary by quintile, but in all cases they are substan-
tially lower than θ̂obs, and θ̂obs falls well outside the 95% confidence interval for θ̂unb
for all quintiles. The null hypothesis that θ̂obs = θ̂unb can be rejected, allowing for the
conclusion that the omission of the Approaches to Learning score causes some
teachers to be incorrectly classified according to their VAM estimate. θ̂bias, the esti-
mated level of misclassification due to unobserved sorting, is simply the difference
between θ̂obs and the expectation of θ̂unb. θ̂bias fluctuates across quintiles, ranging
from about 7.2% in the first quintile to 17.4% in the middle quintile, and averaging
about 11.5% overall. Thus, it can be said that the bias due to the omission of the
Approaches to Learning score causes teachers to be incorrectly classified at a rate
of about 11.5%.
Discussion
This the first analysis to empirically demonstrate that there exists some typically-
unobserved variable that is correlated with both teacher assignment and current
achievement, introducing bias into VAM estimates. Though it is perhaps unsur-
prising given Li-Grining et al.’s (2010) prior work tying it to cognitive gains, the
Approaches to Learning score is a statistically-significant predictor of current test
scores, even after conditioning on other control variables. Additionally, it is condi-
tionally correlated with classroom assignment, thereby fulfilling the requirements
for bias laid out by Goldhaber and Chaplin.
This paper also contributes a permutation test which allows researchers to de-
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termine if the bias resulting from an omitted variables is statistically significant. Ap-
plying a special version of the test to the study at hand, I show that bias stemming
from the omission of the Approaches to Learning score is statistically significant,
and so the relationship between the score and the identified bias is indeed causal.
The permutation test also offers promise as a replacement for the commonly-used
heuristic that results are robust if the inclusion of additional controls moves coeffi-
cient estimates by only a small amount. Instead of using an ambiguous term and
leaving the interpretation of the heuristic up to the researcher, the permutation test
provides a method for determining whether or not the movement in the parameter
is statistically significant.
On top of the evidence of bias and methodological contribution, practically, the
empirical evidence indicates that a failure to include noncognitive scores in value-
added models results in teachers being placed into incorrect value-added quintiles
approximately 11.5% of the time. While conventional value-added models perform
better when tasked with identifying the best and worst teachers, these models still
err in doing so at a rate of about 5.7%. Thus, a policy of firing the lowest-performing
teachers would result in erroneous terminations at a non-negligible rate. If teachers
were instead classified into deciles, the false classification rate would be higher.
The findings in this paper are especially troubling when considering the pro-
portional selection assumption, which states that selection on observable charac-
teristics is proportional to selection on unobserved characteristics (Altonji, Elder,
and Taber 2005). As described in Oster (2013), results are deemed to be robust
if coefficients are unaffected by additional controls, but in this instance it is clear
that adding the Approaches to Learning score has a significant impact on VAM
estimates. Under the proportional selection assumption, then, one cannot reach
the conclusion that VAM estimates are robust to unobserved selection, a finding
32
that has profound ramifications for the appropriateness of using VAM estimates in
hiring and firing decisions.
Future research may be aimed at examining whether or not the bias is mitigated
by evaluating teachers over a few cohorts of students. It could certainly be the
case that VAM estimates from a single year are biased by the omission of the
Approaches to Learning score, but that VAM estimates using three years of data
for each teacher are not. Since the current body of literature typically doesn’t
suggest the termination of teachers after just one year of assessment, the problem
identified here may be rendered moot in the presence of additional years of data.
Unfortunately, the data utilized in this study only contain a single wave of students,
and no other known data sets exist to answer this question.
If evaluating teachers over multiple years does not solve the problem, future
work should attempt to develop new methods for eliminating the bias without com-
plete reliance on student fixed effects. Otherwise, data limitations may make it
possible to fairly evaluate teachers in lower grades. Developing methods to rid
VAM estimates of bias could correspond to large cost savings versus the alter-
native solution of forcing teachers and schools to create and store noncognitive
scores for each student.
Finally, future estimates of labor market benefits stemming from VAM-based ter-
mination policies that are designed to improve test scores should take this bias into
account. If the omission of the Approaches to Learning score introduces additional
uncertainty into VAM estimates, then the omission will introduce some variability
into benefit estimates as well. Of course, if multiple years of measurement or new
techniques are not able to mitigate the bias, then such termination policies might
prove to be impractical in light of the demonstrated inaccuracy, anyway.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Coefficients on Observed Characteristics and Typically-
Unobserved Noncognitive Scores, School Level Fixed Effects
(1)
Lagged Test Score .679∗∗∗
(-0.007)
Minority -.008
(0.013)
Female -0.052 ∗∗∗
(0.009)
Free Lunch -0.038∗∗
(0.014)
Externalizing Problem Behaviors 0.001
(0.011)
Internalizing Problem Behaviors 0.003
(0.010)
Interpersonal Skills -0.010
(0.013)
Self Control -0.006
(0.015)
Approaches to Learning 0.129∗∗∗
(0.011)
Observations 11428
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is test score from end of first grade
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Component (Biasjk) and Overall Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Externalizing Problem Behaviors .0000138 .0006748 -.0025085 .0031769
Internalizing Problem Behaviors -.0000847 .0014894 -.0064531 .0071595
Interpersonal Skills .0001139 .0038291 -.0166674 .0167163
Self Control .0001439 .0020303 -.0088219 .0093759
Approaches to Learning .0060094 .0633015 -.2460409 .2415954
Overall .0061824 .0612254 -.2499989 .226254
Table 2.3: Coefficients on Observed Characteristics and Approaches to
Learning Score, Excluding Other Noncognitive Scores, School Level Fixed
Effects
(1)
Lagged Test Score .681∗∗∗
(0.007)
Minority -.008
(0.012)
Female -0.052 ∗∗∗
(0.009)
Free Lunch -0.035
(0.014)
Approaches to Learning 0.120∗∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 11428
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is test score from end of first grade
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Coefficients on Observed Characteristics and Approaches to
Learning Score, When Including 2nd Lagged Score, School Level Fixed Ef-
fects
(1)
Lagged Test Score .589∗∗∗
(0.011)
2nd Lagged Test Score .104∗∗∗
(0.009)
Minority -.005
(0.013)
Female -0.051 ∗∗∗
(0.009)
Free Lunch -0.024
(0.014)
Approaches to Learning 0.115∗∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 11231
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is test score from end of first grade
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics of Bias from Exclusion of Approaches to Learn-
ing Score, One vs. Two Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Approaches to Learning - One Lag .0041528 .0725980 -.2864553 .2865305
Approaches to Learning - Two Lags -.0033110 .0587389 -.2127328 .2315821
Table 2.6: Quintiles of Conventional VA by Quintiles of Noncognitive VA
Richer VA
Conv. VA 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 92 8 0 0 0 100
2 8 83 10 0 0 100
3 0 10 81 9 0 100
4 0 0 9 87 4 100
5 0 0 0 4 96 100
Total 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 2.7: Summary of Error Rates by Quintile Across 1000 Permutations
Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
Mean 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.002
5th Percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
95th Percentile 0.016 0.027 0.022 0.018 0.009
Observed Error .078 .174 .185 .133 .044
Mean Difference .072 .163 .174 .125 .042
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Chapter 3
Within-School Sorting on Observables and Unobservables:
Evidence from a National Dataset
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Introduction
Most prior education research does not assume that students are matched to
teachers by a random process. Instead, past research posits that the effects of
non-random assignment on the estimation of value-added models, which attempt
to quantify the impact a teacher has on students’ test scores, can be mitigated
by controlling for observable teacher and student characteristics. Recent studies
have indicated, though, that this may not be the case. Rothstein (2010) presented
compelling evidence of sorting within schools, a finding that was confirmed by Betts
and Koedel (2011). While these studies showed the potential for student-teacher
matching, they did not empirically determine the factors upon which this sorting
might occur.
Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille (2013) investigated student sorting within the
Miami public school district, finding that less-experienced and minority teachers
were typically matched to students with characteristics indicative of lower-achieving
students. Dieterle et al. (2012) show that teachers are assigned classes of differing
abilities based on their gender, race, experience, certification, and whether or not
they have an advanced degree. However, the school districts involved in these
studies are not at all representative of the United States as a whole, and therefore
the findings might only apply locally. Further, many variables which may be used
for sorting were not available in the datasets utilized, and so it is not clear whether
or not students might also be sorted on unobservable information.
This analysis builds on prior work in several ways. First, the empirical results
confirm some earlier findings, the first nationally-representative study to do so,
while also noting relationships that have not been previously documented. Addi-
tionally, evidence indicates that the sorting of students to novice or minority teach-
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ers may not be based on test scores, as found in prior work, but is instead based
on factors that are merely correlated with test scores. Finally, this paper demon-
strates that characteristics used to match students to teachers changes over time
as more information about each student is ascertained.
This paper will begin with a review of the literature before describing the data
and outlining the methods. The paper then shows which observed and typically-
unobserved characteristics are used for teacher-student matching in kindergarten
and first grade, extending earlier research by using a nationally representative data
set containing a much wider array of information on teachers, students, and par-
ents. The data are then analyzed within the framework of earlier studies to assess
the impact of model choice on the results. A discussion of the results follows.
Previous Literature
The idea that teacher-student pairing is not completely random is well known to
researchers. Typically, the sorting process has been analyzed with respect to how
teachers are matched to schools. Several studies have demonstrated that urban
schools tend to have a difficult time attracting and retaining high-quality teachers
(Krei 1998, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002). Teachers with more experience
leave for more desirable schools. These schools generally have a larger propor-
tion of white students, with higher levels of both income and achievement across
students (Boyd et al 2005, Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2004, Hanushek, Kain,
and Rivkin 2004, Horng 2009, Jackson 2009, Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner
2008). Sorting across schools thus leads to a situation in which low-income, low-
achieving, and minority students are more likely to be taught by less-qualified and
less-experienced teachers.
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Such an arrangement is especially disheartening when considering the ex-
tent to which teacher quality can impact student outcomes (Taylor et al. 2000).
Additionally, new teachers have generally been shown to be less effective than
their more-experienced counterparts (Nye, Konstantopoulos, Hedges 2004, Rock-
off 2004, Wiswall 2013), though this finding has been subject to some debate
(Hanushek, Rivkin, and Kain 2005). Still, the interaction of teacher sorting and
student outcomes has been shown to have a detrimental effect on economically-
disadvantaged students. Indeed, the fact that minority students tend to have less-
experienced teachers has been suggested as one of the driving forces behind the
black-white achievement gap (Hanushek and Rivkin 2006).
Though most of the attention paid to teacher sorting has focused on sorting
across schools, sorting within schools may occur for various reasons. A few stud-
ies have attempted to tackle this issue from an empirical perspective. Research
on ability grouping and tracking demonstrates how students may be matched to
similar peers based on ability level or other characteristics (Gamoran 1987, Oakes
and Guiton 1995). Since higher-quality or more experienced teachers may be
more likely to teach high-achieving students who have been tracked together (Kelly
2004), this can lead to a matching of high-quality teachers to high-achieving stu-
dents within schools. At the same time, this phenomenon is often specific to the
post-elementary grades.
Aside from the possibilities of tracking and ability grouping, Kalogrides, Loeb,
and Beteille (2013) posit that within-school sorting occurs through power relations
inside of schools. In this system, more experienced, white, and male teachers
exert their influence to assure themselves of the most desirable classes. Less
experienced, minority, and female teachers would therefore be left with less desir-
able students. Teachers may also be sorted to take advantage of minority teachers
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greater effectiveness with or preference for minority students (Dee 2005, Downey
and Pribesh 2004). Additionally, Rothstein (2009) suggests that teacher-student
matching may take place when teachers who are thought to hold an advantage in
teaching a certain set of skills may be matched to those students who need the
additional help. Rothstein also believes that principals might assign desirable stu-
dents to teachers they wish to reward, and misbehaving students to teachers they
do not favor. Parents may also try to match their child to a specific teacher, and in
doing so create a situation where high-quality teachers end up with students with
parents who are more involved in school, on average.
The empirical literature on within-school sorting, outside of grouping and track-
ing research, is a little more sparse. Using administrative data from Florida, Feng
(2010) demonstrates that novice teachers are assigned a greater proportion of
low-income students, minority students, and students with behavioral problems.
Clotfelder, Ladd, and Vigdor (2004) found that new 7th-grade teachers in North
Carolina are assigned more black students relative to more experienced teachers.
One of the most informative works on exactly which factors might be used to
match students to teachers comes from Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille (2013). In
their analysis of data from the Miami public school district, they find that female, mi-
nority, and less experienced teachers are assigned classes of students with lower
prior average test scores, lower prior attendance rates, and more prior behavioral
problems. Additionally, they show that the sorting they identify depends on the
characteristics of all teachers in the school. That is, the likelihood that novice
teachers are assigned less-desirable students increases with the percent of expe-
rienced teachers in the school. Beyond just test scores, they find evidence of racial
matching as well. Using a similar model, Dieterle et al. (2012) generally confirm
these findings in their study of data from an anonymous state, but instead find that
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female teachers are assigned classes with higher previous test scores.
The finding in Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille that students may be matched to
teachers based on previously-observed behavior is quite important, especially in
light of Rothsein’s (2009) conclusion that students might be matched to teachers on
unobserved student characteristics. After all, the data sets utilized for value-added
or peer effects research often do not contain controls for behavior. If teacher-
student matching occurs on student behavior or other variables that are typically
not observed by the researcher, then such sorting could introduce bias into these
models. For example, if lower-achieving students are typically those exhibiting
disruptive behavior, then unobserved peer effects could bias estimates relating to
test scores.
In fact, some of the most sizable, documented peer effects have been those that
result from disruptive behavior. Lazear (2001) was the first to propose a framework
under which disruptive behavior might hinder peer achievement, and subsequent
empirical work has confirmed his hypothesis (Figlio 2007, Fletcher 2010, Neidell
and Waldfogel 2008). Figlio finds that adding one additional disruptive student
to a classroom reduces the test scores of all other students in the classroom by
roughly four percent. Similarly, Fletcher shows that the presence of a student
with serious emotional problems reduces peer test scores by about one-tenth of
a standard deviation. Both of these effects are large compared to test score peer
effects found in well-controlled studies such as Burke and Sass (2008). Sorting
based on prior behavior could additionally be undesirable if the teachers to which
misbehaving students are matched are subsequently more inclined to leave the
profession. Turnover among new teachers might be higher due to this sorting if
new teachers are assigned more poorly-behaving students, for example. Assuming
that these teachers are replaced by other new teachers, this would result in a less-
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experienced pool of teachers.
Given the lack of understanding regarding teacher-student sorting, especially
that which could occur based on unobservable characteristics, the current study
adds to the literature by more closely investigating how this matching occurs with
a special emphasis on the role of family characteristics typically unobserved in
standard administrative data sets.
Data
This study uses data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study Kindergarten
Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K), provided by the National Center for Education Statis-
tics (NCES). The ECLS-K is a nationally representative sample of over 20,000
students who entered kindergarten in the fall of 1998 (Tourangeau et al. 2009).
These students were spread across roughly 1,000 schools and 2,500 classrooms,
and so the sample contains information on about 2.5 classrooms per school and
8 students per classroom, on average. Weights to correct for sampling variability
are provided in the data, and the relevant cross-sectional student weights are used
in this analysis. Estimates do not appear to be sensitive to the use or choice of
weight.
Data such as family and school characteristics, student demographic informa-
tion, subjective assessments, and standardized test scores was obtained from
teachers, parents, and administrators in the fall of kindergarten and the spring of
kindergarten, 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 8th grade. The time between the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and
8th grades preclude the post-1st grade years from this analysis, as it is expected
that classroom assignment would be conducted mostly on information observed
during the immediately preceding year. Additionally, in later grades sometimes
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only one or two students are sampled in each classroom, and so classroom-level
characteristics would be measured with substantial error.
It is clear that the ECLS-K sample has two distinct advantages over data sets
used in earlier studies. First, it is nationally representative, and further, the ECLS-
K data set contains many variables that are not included in data sets which have
historically been used for value-added research. The breadth of the available vari-
ables will allow for the identification of the characteristics on which student-teacher
sorting occurs, including those that would commonly be unobserved.
As mentioned earlier, Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille showed that students were
matched to teachers based on student behavior. While the ECLS-K data set
does not contain information on student suspensions as in Kalogrides, Loeb, and
Beteille, it does provide well-validated measures of teacher assessments that are
thought to serve as appropriate behavioral measures. The Externalizing Problem
Behaviors score is constructed from teacher assessments of how often students
argued, fought, became angry, acted impulsively, and disturbed ongoing activities
(Tourangeau et al. 2009).5
The Externalizing Problem Behaviors score measures disruptive behavior with
error, but similar noncognitive scores have been used as measures of student
behavior in earlier research. Downey and Pribesh (2005) used the Externaliz-
ing Problem Behavior scores in their aforementioned study of differences in as-
sessment based on racial mismatches between students and teachers. The same
score was used in a similar manner by Finn and Pannozzo (2004), and was em-
ployed by Neidell and Waldfogel (2008) in their behavioral peer effects research.
Other noncognitive scores included in the ECLS-K data will also be employed
5These assessments were turned into a composite score, with 1 reflecting the lowest amount of
the relevant behavior, and 4 reflecting the highest amount of relevant behavior. Thus, a rating of 4
would be considered the worst level of externalized problem behaviors.
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in this study, including Self-Control, Approaches to Learning, Internalizing Prob-
lem Behaviors, and Interpersonal Skills scores. Waldfogel and Neidell showed
that classroom assignment in the first grade may be correlated with these scores,
and so it seems prudent to include them in this discussion. At the same time,
it is not clear whether or not sorting occurs based on these scores or based on
other factors correlated with these scores. For example, black students typically
have poorer noncognitive scores, and it is important to distinguish between sorting
based on race and sorting based on noncognitive skills.
As noted, previous studies have found within- and across-school teacher sort-
ing based on test scores, race, and behavior. As such, each of these possibilities
will be considered. Additionally, family-level characteristics will be included to de-
termine whether or not there may be further sorting on these variables. For exam-
ple, it may be the case that teachers prefer students who have a father present in
the household in the absence of observed information regarding ability or behav-
ior, since the presence of a father may be correlated with both. By incorporating a
wider set of family-level information than typically found in administrative data sets,
I am able to investigate the role of unobservables in the sorting process.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to outline the different clas-
sifications of teachers that will be used in this paper. With respect to experience,
teachers are separated based on two distinct cutoffs. ‘Novice’ teachers will be de-
fined as those with seven years or less of experience. This definition is somewhat
arbitrary, but it is the same definition used in Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille, and
additionally is approximately the median years of experience in the ECLS-K data.
Thus, it provides a good balance of observations when regressions specific to one
type of teacher are estimated.
At the same time, it isn’t clear that such a grouping most closely matches any
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true criteria used by administrators in assigning students to teachers. In other
words, it is not known whether teachers with seven years of experience are sorted
to students in a manner that is more similar to teachers with eight years of expe-
rience or to teachers with six years of experience Therefore, ‘beginner’ teachers
will refer to those teachers with three years of experience or less. Using multiple
definitions will allow for the testing of the sensitivity of these results to the differ-
ent group designations. For both ‘beginning’ and ‘novice’ teachers, ‘experienced’
teachers will be teachers with more than three or more than seven years experi-
ence teaching, respectively. Minority teachers are those who are coded as ‘No’ for
the ECLS-K variable indicating whether or not the teacher is white. White teachers
are those who are coded ‘Yes’.
To aid in a comparison with previous studies, classroom means by experience
or race are presented in Table 3.1. Beginning, novice, and minority teachers tend
to be assigned to classrooms with characteristics that are generally less conducive
to academic success when compared to experienced teachers (Table 3.1). These
classrooms have lower average reading and math scores, a higher proportion of
male and minority students, more students who are eligible for free or reduced
lunch, fewer students with older siblings, fewer students with moms who have a
high school degree, fewer students with fathers in the household, and larger class
sizes. Some of the noted differences, such as the proportion of students with
older siblings, have not been discussed in earlier research, because prior studies
focused only on the top five variables due to a lack of information regarding the
bottom three. Overall, though, the summary statistics suggest the type of matching
that has been noted in prior works.
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Methods
Though the comparison on means is enlightening, many of the characteristics
are correlated, so it is difficult to determine the factors on which sorting actually
occurs. To examine the extent to which various factors affect classroom placement,
simple linear probability models (LPMs) will be used. In all models, school-level
fixed effects are used to isolate within-school sorting, as that is the emphasis of this
study. Thus, LPMs are appropriate for this analysis as they are often seen as more
suitable than logit or probit models for panel data methods. Further, the emphasis
of the analysis is not on predicting probabilities, and so some of the shortcomings
of LPMs are not as relevant. Because some variables are only available at the
classroom level, and because prior work used classroom-level information, the
models are constructed at the classroom level. The linear probability models are
Ic = β0 + β1TScorec + β2Demc + β3Famc + β4CSizec + εc
Ic represents Bc, Nc, or Mc, which are dummy variables indicating whether
or not the classroom was taught by a beginning teacher, a novice teacher, or
a minority teacher, respectively. These are regressed on a vector of classroom
mean student test score variables, TScorec, classroom mean student demographic
variables (percent minority, percent female, percent eligible for free lunch), Demc,
mean family characteristic variables (percent with older sibling, percent with moth-
ers who have a high school degree, percent with no father in household), Famc,
and a class size variable, CSizec. The percent female, percent minority, and class
size variables are classroom-level variables in the ECLS-K data set, while the other
means are constructed using individual student-level variables. All variables were
collected at the beginning of the kindergarten year.
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This model is slightly different from that used in both Kalogrides, Loeb, and
Beteille and Dieterle et al., which instead regressed each classroom characteristic
independently on a vector of teacher characteristic variables. The choice of the
different model is sensible given the different emphasis of the present study. In
this study, the only interest is in sorting on teacher experience or race, which were
identified as two important teacher characteristics for sorting in both of these earlier
studies. For independent variables, a broader set of student characteristics are
considered.
The limited sample size of about eight students per classroom, high prevalence
of missing data, and lack of variation in dependent variables within schools present
a number of challenges. To reduce the loss of sample size due to missing data,
missing classroom mean values were replaced with school means where avail-
able. These school means are differenced out in the fixed effects model, but the
observations are not omitted from the analysis as they otherwise would have been
due to their missing classroom information. In cases where a mean value could
not be determined for any classroom in the school, all classrooms in the school
were omitted. After carrying out the missing value replacement, each regression
equation was estimated independently.
Results
Results in Table 3.3, Table 3.4, and Table 3.5 are provided both with and with-
out school level fixed effects for comparison. It is interesting to note that there is
little evidence of inexperienced and minority teachers teaching a greater propor-
tion of economically disadvantaged students, measured by free and reduced lunch
eligibility, as in earlier studies. The results from those models without fixed effects
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confirm earlier findings. Column 1 of Tables 3.3 and 3.4, for example, show that
less experienced teachers are more likely to teach in schools with more minority
students. The same columns also show some evidence that teachers are sorted
across schools based on student gender, though the majority of this association
seems to take place within schools. This may make sense, as teachers might be
unlikely to switch schools due to a perceived desirability of students based on the
gender composition, which is generally quite homogenous. As a note, the pattern
observed here does not significantly change when restricting the analysis to only
public schools, which are not likely to be exclusively male or female (results not
shown).
Even though the traditional regressions provide interesting results not noted
in earlier studies, the focus of this study is on within-school sorting, and so fixed
effects must be employed. With fixed effects, it appears as though less experi-
enced teachers are assigned a higher proportion of male students, though this is
not quite significant for beginner teachers. Male students are often regarded as
exhibiting more disruptive classroom behavior, so it could be the case that experi-
enced teachers prefer a greater proportion of female students. Minority students
are also generally judged to be more disruptive, and the evidence indicates that
beginner and novice teachers are allotted more minority students as well. These
findings would seem to be line with Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille, given the less-
desirable behavior associated with these students.
Perhaps an even more intriguing finding, though, is that less experienced teach-
ers are assigned within schools to classes of a relatively smaller size. Reduced
class sizes are sometimes thought to be associated with improved test scores
(Glass and Smith 1979, Hedges, Laine, and Greenewald 1994, Slavin 1989),
though this is not universally accepted (Hanushek 1997, Hoxby 2000, Robinson
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and Wittebols 1986). Assuming that teachers desire classrooms that are smaller
so that they can spend less time dealing with disruptive students and more time on
instruction (Finn, Pannozo, and Achilles 2003), one might guess that more experi-
enced teachers would exert their influence to obtain reduced class sizes.
In contrast to earlier research, the results also show that novice teachers are
assigned classes with higher average reading scores. The theory behind how this
might take place is not clear, since the reading scores are not observed until after
the classroom assignments have been made. It seems unlikely that novice teach-
ers would be able to affect reading test scores in the short amount of time before
students take the tests. Barring that alternative, the relationship documented here
would seem to contradict prior work, though the diverging conclusions may only be
a result of the differing model choice, which will be examined in more detail in the
next section.
The results in Table 3.5 further demonstrate that minority teachers are matched
to a greater proportion of minority students, as found in earlier studies, and that
minority teachers teach more students who do not have fathers in the household.
Given the lower achievement and more problematic behavior of minority students,
it seems reasonable to conclude that some teachers might prefer to avoid them
when possible. At the same time, it may be the case that minority teachers prefer
minority students, or that minority teachers are thought to be more effective with
minority students, both theories that have been put forth in earlier works.
For reference, Table 3.3, Table 3.4, and Table 3.5 also provide the results of
the same regressions when the independent variables are limited to those most
commonly found in education data sets. When excluding the additional variables,
the coefficients on the remaining variables remain generally consistent, though
they do change slightly. Though certainly not a statistical test, this provides some
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evidence that the coefficients in the sorting model are not measurably altered by
the inclusion or exclusion of the typically-unobserved variables.
While these results are interesting, one concern is that assignment of students
based on experience and race happens simultaneously, and thus independent es-
timations of the equations could lead to incorrect conclusions. To test this, seem-
ingly unrelated regression (SUR) models are used, which allow the error terms
to be correlated across equations. Again using fixed effects, the results from the
SUR models are displayed in Table 3.6. Here we find little evidence of sorting
based on experience. Regardless of which classification of teacher experience is
used, the results confirm the findings that minority teachers are matched to more
minority students and more students without fathers in the household. It should be
emphasized that the sorting on the presence of a father in the household is true
even when controlling for minority status, which is perhaps the most interesting
conclusion that can be reached from these results.
It is important to note that the differences in findings between the independent
regressions in Tables 3.2-3.5 and the seemingly-unrelated regressions in Table
3.6 appear to be primarily due to the different, smaller sample. The regressions
on experience in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 include a school if it has both a less-
experienced and a more-experienced teacher, while the regressions on race in
Table 3.5 include a school if it has both a white and minority teacher. In Table 3.6,
schools are only included if they have teachers of both experience levels and both
race classifications included in the sample. Results from independent regressions
limited to those same schools show results in Table 3.7 that are quite similar to the
simultaneous case. This implies that the lack of significance on the class size vari-
able, for example, in the seemingly unrelated regression is not due to a difference
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in standard errors but is instead simply due to a change in samples.6
To circumvent the issues of both simultaneity and a limited sample, a linear
probability model considering schools with only white teachers is estimated. If
a school only contains white teachers, then no sorting on race could happen si-
multaneously with sorting on experience. These results are given in Table 3.8.
When conditioning on teacher race, there is a strong correlation indicating that
less experienced teachers are assigned to smaller classes. There is once again
an indication of matching of novice teachers to students with higher reading scores
and smaller classes, while the relationship between less experienced teachers and
more male students is marginally insignificant in each case. These findings lend
credence to the same findings in the full model that was estimated independently,
though it isn’t clear if these finding would also apply to schools with a mix of teacher
races or only minority teachers. Unfortunately, the sample size is not sufficient to
test the latter.
Now that the purposeful sorting of kindergarten teachers to students has been
examined, it may be informative to investigate how this matching process might
evolve as students enter their second year in school. After all, much more informa-
tion about each student is known at the beginning of the first grade year. Similar
models will be used, but lagged cognitive and noncognitive scores will be employed
to help determine the extent to which information obtained during kindergarten is
used to match students to teachers in the second year. The linear probability mod-
els are now
Ic = β0 + β1TScorect−1 + β2Demc + β3Famc + β4CSizec + β5NonCogct−1 + εc
In the revised model, TScorect−1 is a vector of mean cognitive test scores from
6It may be the case that teachers are assigned to students differently in these schools than other
sampled schools, or this might merely be a result of the lower number of observations and resulting
impact on tests of statistical significance.
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the spring of the kindergarten year across all students in the current first grade
classroom. NonCogct−1 is a vector of mean classroom noncognitive scores from
the same time. Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.2.
The means, more or less, mirror those in kindergarten, but there are more
pronounced differences in free lunch eligibility and the percent of students with
older siblings. The noncognitive scores also show some differences, but these are
mostly between minority and non-minority teachers. Since minority teachers ap-
parently have more minority students, and since the noncognitive scores are highly
correlated with student race, this is not surprising. To separate the variables truly
responsible for sorting from those simply correlated with those variables, regres-
sion analysis will again be utilized.
Linear probability models with school-level fixed effects will be used, since the
focus is on within-school rather than between-school variation. In the ECLS-K data,
a small subset of students who switched districts between the kindergarten and
first grade years are followed into their new schools. Thus, some schools become
part of the ECLS-K sample due to students moving into them. Because these
schools have a limited number of sampled students, and because we would expect
schools to have less information about students moving into the district than those
who were previously in the district, these schools are omitted from the analysis.
Additionally, all students moving into sample schools between kindergarten and
1st grade are omitted, again due to the lower level of information known about
them. Results from the first grade models are given in Table 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11.
When not using fixed effects, the evidence in Tables 3.9-3.11 makes it clear that
teachers are sorted across schools based on student race. Beginner, novice, and
minority teachers all teach classrooms that contain, on average, a higher percent
of minority students when compared to their experienced and white peers. Minority
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teachers are now shown to be matched to fewer students with older siblings. While
such a correlation has not been previously noted, it could be that an older sibling
provides additional information about a younger student, and that white teachers
prefer students about which they have more information.
As opposed to the kindergarten year, there is no longer any apparent sorting
on student gender, and the coefficients are no longer close to being statistically
significant. Further, the coefficient that relates the percent of the class that are
in a minority group to teacher race is now marginally insignificant at the .05 level.
Beginner teachers are demonstrated to be assigned smaller class sizes, though
this relationship is not quite significant for novice teachers any longer.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that little additional sorting is observed
based on teacher experience in the first grade. The lack of correlation is especially
true of novice teachers, but also is the case when looking at beginners, with the
only significant relationship being that beginner teachers are assigned more stu-
dents who do not have fathers present in the household. Thus, when employing
a nationally-representative sample and using the model as specified, the results
do not confirm the findings in earlier works that novice teachers are matched to
students with lower prior test scores or more minority students.
These results are quite striking, especially with respect to test scores. All pre-
vious studies have demonstrated that minority teachers are assigned classrooms
with lower average test scores. In this case, the data instead show a positive but
insignificant relationship between prior test scores and assignment to a minority
teacher. Further, previous studies have shown that novice teachers are also as-
signed classes of lower-scoring students. While the evidence cannot rule out the
matching of students to inexperienced teachers based on test scores, any such
relationship is nowhere close to being statistically significant.
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As in kindergarten, it is possible that classroom assignment based on race
and experience might be simultaneously determined, indicating that a seemingly
unrelated regression model is appropriate. When considering such a model, the
results in Table 3.12 show that novice teachers are matched to students with higher
(less-desirable) Internalizing Problem Behavior scores. Less experienced teachers
also appear to be sorted to classrooms with higher prior average reading scores,
which again would seem to contradict earlier studies. Suggestive evidence of a
relationship between experience and class size remains, but the coefficients are
now slightly insignificant.
The results with respect to sorting based on teacher race are interesting as
well. Here, there is evidence that minority teachers are matched to students with
higher prior average reading scores. Once again, it appears as though minority
teachers are assigned fewer students with older siblings. When using the beginner
distinction of teacher experience, the evidence shows that these teachers are also
assigned students with lower (less-desirable) Approaches to Learning scores. As
in Table 3.11, the relationship between minority students and placement with a
minority teacher is marginally insignificant. Just like in kindergarten, Table 3.13
suggests that any differences between the SUR and independent models are due
mostly to a change in samples rather than due to simultaneous assignment.
As before, an independent model for sorting on experience is estimated while
only including schools with only white teachers. The results in Table 3.14 show little
evidence of sorting based on experience, with no evidence of this type of sorting
for novice teachers. When considering beginner teachers, the results show only
that these teachers are assigned to more students who do not have fathers in the
household. This may be consistent with Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beitelle, since stu-
dents without fathers in the household tend to have higher Externalizing Problem
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Behavior scores, which are indicative of more disruptive classroom behavior. As in
previous iterations, the class size variable falls very close to statistical significance.
Given the sometimes differing results, what can be said about the evidence
thus far? Conservatively, it seems fair to conclude that less experienced teachers
are assigned smaller classes in kindergarten. There is also some evidence that
these teachers are assigned more male students and to students with higher av-
erage reading scores. Minority teachers appear to be matched within schools to
more minority students and more students who do not have fathers in the house-
hold. In first grade, there is some indication that less experienced teachers are
given small class sizes, but there is little strong evidence beyond that. Minority
teachers are matched to more students who do not have an older sibling. Most
surprisingly, the only potential evidence of sorting based on prior test scores is that
minority and less experienced teachers might be assigned classrooms with higher
prior average reading scores, when controlling for the other factors in this analysis.
Additionally, the models using the beginner/experienced groupings generally out-
performed the models using the novice/experienced groupings, as measured by
the correlation coefficients and F statistics. Thus, for the remainder of this paper,
the beginner/experienced grouping will be used in all models.
Taking these away as the main conclusions, a few important questions must
now be answered.
Why do these results differ from earlier studies?
There are several discrepancies between this study and prior works. First and
foremost, there is little evidence that less experienced or minority teachers are as-
signed classrooms with lower prior test scores, which directly contradicts findings
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by Kalorgrides, Loeb, and Beitelle, by Dieterle et al., and by the Strategic Data
Project (2012). Why might this be?
One possibility is that it is the a result of the different sample used. None
of the earlier studies used a nationally-representative data set, so it is possible
that sorting in the schools selected for those studies differs in some way from the
sorting in schools in the ECLS-K sample. At the same time, it could also be a
consequence of the different model used in this analysis. As noted earlier, the
model in this study predicts teacher experience or minority status as a function
of several classroom-level variables. The model thus differs from earlier studies
where classroom-level variables were independently modeled as dependent on
multiple teacher characteristic variables. Such a model perhaps has the advantage
of being better suited to identifying the teacher characteristics associated with each
classroom-level variable. However, it is not as adept at noting correlation between
classroom-level characteristics. That is, when determining the coefficient relating
the teacher characteristics to prior test scores, such a model ignores the possibility
that minority students, who tend to have lower test scores, might be sorted to less
experienced and minority teachers. One might conclude that sorting occurs on test
scores when in fact the principal is only matching students to teachers based on
minority status.
To see if the different findings are a result of the data or due to the model, a
similar model to earlier studies will be used with the ECLS-K data.
Characteristicc = β0 + β1Bc + β2Mc + εc
Characteristicc takes on the value of each classroom characteristic variable in
independent regressions. For kindergarten, these characteristics are the percent
minority, percent female, and percent of students eligible for free lunch. In first
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grade, the average lagged reading and math scores are added. These character-
istics were chosen as they are those used in prior studies. Bc and Mc are indicator
variables for beginner or minority teacher status.
Table 3.15 provides the results, and the general findings do not represent a
huge deviation from the previous model. Minority students are still found to be
sorted to minority teachers, and male students appear to be sorted to beginner
teachers regardless of model specification. Though interesting, the main departure
from earlier studies and the results found in this analysis is in the first grade and
with respect to test scores and free lunch eligibility. Those results are given in Table
3.16.
Many of the coefficients are consistent with the previous model with respect to
their direction and statistical significance. Minority teachers are still found to be
matched to more minority students. The relationship between minority teachers
and average prior reading test scores is similar, though when using this model the
effect is not quite significant. The most important finding, though, is that beginning
teachers are shown to be assigned students with lower prior test scores in both
the full sample and in the sample that includes only those schools with only white
teachers. This is true of both reading and math scores, though the reading score is
not significant in the full sample at the .05 level (p=.063). These results are in stark
contrast to the model used in this paper, where no remotely-significant negative
correlations were encountered, and where the coefficients on reading scores were
almost universally positive.
Thus, the results in this paper do not refute prior studies in which less experi-
enced teachers were found to be matched to students with lower prior test scores.
Indeed, the findings are consistent with those earlier works. The ECLS-K data
do show that beginning teachers are in fact assigned classes with lower prior test
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scores, demonstrating this for the first time at a national level. However, the nature
of this model and the additional variables put forth the possibility that these assign-
ments are made not entirely on test scores but perhaps on other variables that are
correlated with test scores, such as the presence of a father in the household or
race. Noting that the relationship might not be based on test scores but on factors
correlated with test scores substantially alters the story that these results can tell
us. It may be the case that test scores, race, and presence of a father are all noisy
indicators of disruptive behavior, and that the matching process occurs on behavior
rather than test scores.
One might think that such a distinction is unimportant. After all, if test scores are
perfectly correlated with the unobserved classroom characteristic, then controlling
for test scores is enough to control for the unobserved information. If test scores
are not perfectly correlated with the unobserved variables, though, then bias would
be introduced into estimates of teacher-student sorting, and this bias is apparent
in the empirical results. Further, such sorting on unobservables might bias other
estimates using student characteristics as controls. For example, if classroom be-
havior is not observed, and if behavioral peer effects are large, then the systematic
assignment of poorly-behaving students to certain types of teachers would make
those teachers look less effective than they really are.
Does student sorting change by grade?
While inexperienced teachers might be matched to more male students in kinder-
garten, this appears not to be the case in the first grade. Similarly, only in the first
grade do these teachers appear to be matched to students based on the pres-
ence of a father. As for minority teachers, the evidence shows that they are sorted
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to more minority students and more students without fathers in the household in
kindergarten, while they are matched to more students with older siblings in first
grade. Of course, it would not be prudent to assume different effects across years
simply because a variable is insignificant in one grade but not the other.
Instead, the consistent variables across kindergarten and 1st grade will be sta-
tistically evaluated to determine their differences. First, a dummy variable indicating
beginner or minority status was estimated using those variables that are present in
each year: percent of students with an older sibling, percent with a father present,
percent with a mom who has a high school degree, percent female, and percent mi-
nority. Then, the generated coefficients from kindergarten were applied to the first
grade characteristics to predict beginner or minority status in that grade. Residu-
als were calculated by comparing the predicted presence of a beginner or minority
teacher to the actual presence. Then, these residuals were regressed on the first
grade characteristics. School level fixed effects were used in all cases.
If sorting does not change by grade then the coefficients from kindergarten
should predict the beginner or minority status in first grade, and any residuals
should be independently and identically distributed according to a normal distri-
bution. A correlation between the residuals and the first grade variables would
mean that the residuals are not distributed in this way, and thus we can say that
the sorting does in fact change.
The results generally confirm suspicions. There is a large and strongly signif-
icant correlation between the residual and both the percent of females in the first
grade class and the total class size, indicating that the sorting based on these char-
acteristics to teachers of varying experience levels varies by grade. The sorting of
minority teachers to both children without older siblings and students who do not
have a father present also appears to change across grades, as both of these coef-
64
ficients are statistically significant. It does not appear as though minority teachers
are necessarily assigned to minority students in a way that differs across grades.
This is not overly surprising, though, as the coefficient on the sorting variable was
only marginally insignificant in the first grade.
As a whole, the findings imply that the teacher-student matching process defi-
nitely changes across grades. This may be due to the additional information about
each student obtained during the kindergarten year. Otherwise, though unlikely, it
may be the case that some characteristics observable in both years are used for
sorting in one grade but not the other.
Discussion
This analysis demonstrates that minority students are sorted to minority teach-
ers within schools, and that less experienced teachers are assigned classrooms
with lower average prior test scores. These two findings are consistent with results
from previous studies, which were not based on nationally-representative samples.
However, other findings in the current study differ from previous results. While the
correlation between lower-achieving students and less experienced teachers was
observed, the sorting was found to instead be based on other variables that are
correlated with test scores. There is no conclusive evidence that less experienced
teachers are assigned a greater proportion of minority students, or that minority
teachers are purposefully matched to classrooms with lower average prior test
scores. It is important to note that this is not to say that these claims are not true;
rather, they simply cannot be verified using this data set.
While some factors thought to be used in matching teachers to students were
not verified in this analysis, other classroom characteristics proved to be good
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predictors of teacher experience or race. Less experienced teachers were found to
be matched within schools to more male students in kindergarten and smaller class
sizes, neither of which had been previously documented. Further, the results show
that minority teachers are matched to fewer students with fathers in the household
in first grade and, in kindergarten, to fewer students with older siblings, which also
have not been established earlier.
Choosing to use the model employed in this study rather than the model used
in earlier studies appears to matter a great deal when assessing teacher-student
matching. As noted, when applying the model used in earlier studies to ECLS-K
data, the finding that less experienced teachers are assigned students with lower
prior test scores is replicated. However, it appears as though sorting may occur
based on factors correlated with test scores (like presence of a father) rather on test
scores themselves, which substantially changes the implications of these results.
Test scores are generally observed and so they can be controlled for, while many
other potential sorting factors are not.
There is quite convincing evidence that the classroom assignment process
differs between grades, potentially implying that information gleaned during the
kindergarten year is used to assign students to teachers in the first grade year.
The idea that the differing assignment process occurs as a result of the different
information available before each grade is only a working hypothesis, though, and
not something that can be tested using the available data.
Aside from model choice, the reasons for the differences between this study
and earlier work could be many. In the case of older siblings and fathers in the
household, the relationship may not have been found earlier simply because such
detailed family information is often not available in similar data sets. Additionally,
prior studies used data from school districts that have mixtures of teachers and
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students that are not at all nationally representative. Thus, some of the prior find-
ings may be applicable to those school districts, or potentially school districts that
are similar, but not to all schools. It is also possible that some evidence of sorting
is, in essence, lost in aggregation. If some urban school districts tend to sort stu-
dents with lower prior test scores to novice teachers, for example, and some rural
schools districts sort these students to experienced teachers, then no sorting at all
will be observed in the data. Ideally, an analysis based on school type would be
carried out, but the sample size is too limited to permit this.
One possible weakness of this analysis is that it uses sample data, so esti-
mated proportions of students with relevant characteristics in each classroom are
not as precise as in other studies. Earlier studies contained information on every
student, allowing for a better detection of differences across classrooms. However,
any overestimation or underestimation of proportions in one classroom should cor-
respond to an offsetting overestimation or underestimation in another, so this factor
would only be responsible for the differences if teacher sorting was correlated with
irregularities in the ECLS-K sampling or weighting.
Overall, this paper provides external validity for some findings in earlier works.
Additionally, the evidence shows that variables truly used for matching may dif-
fer from those that had been previously been accepted, and that sorting occurs
on variables not generally observed in administrative data sets. Future research
should assess the impact of such sorting on models which implicitly assume stu-
dents are randomly distributed conditional upon observed characteristics, since
this is shown not to be the case. Specifically, the impact on value-added models
must be assessed, particularly in early grades where prior achievement lags are
not available.
67
Tables
Table 3.1: Kindergarten Classroom Composition by Teacher Experience or
Race
≤ 3 Yrs > 3 Yrs ≤ 7 Yrs > 7 Yrs Minority White
Math 48.33* 49.46 48.75 49.43 46.78* 49.65
Reading 46.78* 48.22 47.38 48.12 46.13* 48.51
% Minority 49.59* 41.64 47.19* 41.00 78.28* 37.53
% Female 48.24 48.64 47.86 49.32 47.66 48.12
% Free Lunch 53.14 51.97 52.67 52.04 69.75* 48.12
% w/ Older Sib 50.44 51.26 50.73 51.27 48.14 51.29
% Mom HS Degree 86.86 88.45 87.10 88.89 84.51* 89.38
% No Dad in HH 24.66 23.41 24.55 22.95 41.37* 21.65
Class Size 19.53 19.50 19.92* 19.04 20.47* 19.40
* indicates significant difference in means between teacher experience levels or
between minority and white teachers at .01 level
Table 3.2: 1st Grade Classroom Composition by Teacher Experience or Race
≤ 3 Yrs > 3 Yrs ≤ 7 Yrs > 7 Yrs Minority White
Math, Lagged 49.47* 50.50 49.76* 50.60 47.10* 50.71
Reading, Lagged 48.72* 49.79 48.96* 49.99 47.45* 50.08
% Minority 44.71* 34.41 42.92* 31.84 62.80* 33.22
% Female 46.88 47.36 47.01 47.41 47.40 47.17
% Free Lunch 48.18* 43.84 47.42* 42.77 64.69* 41.45
% w/ Older Sib 46.11* 49.32 46.89 49.80 42.71* 48.77
% Mom HS Degree 84.53 86.54 84.49* 87.62 81.96* 87.56
% No Dad in HH 24.46* 21.45 23.33 21.59 37.51* 20.72
Ext Prob Beh, Lag 1.69* 1.64 1.67 1.64 1.76* 1.65
Int Prob Beh, Lag 1.56 1.55 1.57 1.54 1.58 1.56
Self Control, Lag 3.11 3.15 3.12 3.16 2.98* 3.17
Interpersonal, Lag 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.10 2.96* 3.11
App to Learn, Lag 3.05 3.10 3.06 3.10 2.93* 3.10
Class Size 20.13* 18.73 20.41* 21.28 18.98* 3.10
* indicates significant difference in means between teacher experience levels
between minority and white teachers at .01 level
68
Table 3.3: Independent LPM Results, Beginner vs. Experienced Teachers,
With and Without School-Level FE, Full vs. Limited Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginner Beginner-FE Beginner Beginner-FE
Math -0.0114 -0.00401 -0.0115 -0.00458
(-1.49) (-0.40) (-1.51) (-0.46)
Reading 0.0147 0.0209 0.0142 0.0214
(1.70) (1.86) (1.65) (1.91)
% Minority 0.104∗∗ 0.0398 0.102∗∗ 0.0207
(2.65) (0.44) (2.68) (0.23)
% Female -0.197∗ -0.205 -0.198∗ -0.210
(-2.00) (-1.57) (-2.01) (-1.61)
% Free Lunch -0.0444 0.000897 -0.0429 -0.00420
(-1.21) (0.02) (-1.23) (-0.08)
Class Size -0.00978∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.00968∗∗∗ -0.0205∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.92) (-3.45) (-3.84)
% w/ Older Sib -0.00139 -0.0111
(-0.03) (-0.23)
% Mom HS 0.0269 0.102
(0.52) (1.51)
% No Dad 0.0316 0.0291
(0.72) (0.52)
Constant 0.656∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗
(7.57) (6.25) (10.06) (8.01)
Observations 1792 1792 1792 1792
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
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Table 3.4: Independent LPM Results, Novice vs. Experienced Teachers, With
and Without School-Level FE, Full vs. Limited Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Novice Novice-FE Novice Novice-FE
Math -0.0119 -0.0170 -0.0122 -0.0166
(-1.50) (-1.65) (-1.52) (-1.62)
Reading 0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0449∗∗∗
(4.06) (3.93) (3.93) (3.83)
% Minority 0.0995∗ 0.0799 0.112∗∗ 0.0854
(2.53) (0.86) (2.93) (0.93)
% Female -0.154 -0.265∗ -0.151 -0.258∗
(-1.52) (-2.03) (-1.49) (-1.99)
% Free Lunch -0.0486 -0.0457 -0.0309 -0.0308
(-1.32) (-0.90) (-0.88) (-0.62)
Class Size -0.00551 -0.0144∗∗ -0.00563∗ -0.0145∗∗
(-1.93) (-2.89) (-1.98) (-2.91)
% w/ Older Sib 0.00878 0.0333
(0.21) (0.70)
% Mom HS -0.0510 -0.0319
(-0.96) (-0.47)
% No Dad 0.0677 0.0673
(1.51) (1.20)
Constant 0.732∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗
(8.44) (7.33) (10.17) (8.47)
Observations 1783 1783 1783 1783
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.5: Independent LPM Results, Minority vs. White Teachers, With and
Without School-Level FE, Full vs. Limited Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minority Minority-FE Minority Minority-FE
Math -0.00301 0.0130 -0.00598 0.0121
(-0.27) (0.84) (-0.53) (0.78)
Reading 0.000224 0.00763 -0.00457 0.00600
(0.02) (0.41) (-0.31) (0.32)
% Minority 0.279∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗
(4.43) (2.71) (4.73) (2.72)
% Female -0.194 -0.162 -0.224 -0.173
(-1.26) (-0.77) (-1.45) (-0.83)
% Free Lunch -0.100 -0.0996 -0.0476 -0.0503
(-1.74) (-1.28) (-0.87) (-0.67)
Class Size -0.00419 -0.0106 -0.00408 -0.0112
(-1.02) (-1.35) (-0.99) (-1.43)
% w/ Older Sib 0.0580 0.0622
(0.97) (0.88)
% Mom HS -0.000132 -0.0405
(-0.00) (-0.45)
% No Dad 0.214∗∗∗ 0.192∗
(3.55) (2.47)
Constant 0.297∗ 0.385∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗
(2.41) (2.14) (3.63) (2.76)
Observations 682 682 682 682
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: Simultaneous LPM Results, With School-Level FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SUR, Beg SUR, Nov SUR, Min-Beg SUR, Min-Nov
Math -0.0200 -0.00891 0.00897 0.0175
(-1.37) (-0.66) (0.67) (1.39)
Reading 0.0293 0.0295 0.00265 0.00564
(1.66) (1.74) (0.17) (0.36)
% Minority -0.0776 -0.196 0.415∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(-0.55) (-1.47) (3.20) (3.97)
% Females -0.0393 -0.204 0.139 0.0610
(-0.20) (-1.07) (0.78) (0.35)
% Free Lunch 0.0283 -0.0578 -0.105 -0.145∗
(0.40) (-0.88) (-1.62) (-2.37)
% w/ Older Sib 0.0528 0.0822 0.0526 0.0514
(0.85) (1.36) (0.92) (0.91)
% Mom HS 0.132 -0.0259 -0.0228 -0.0316
(1.73) (-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.45)
% No Dad -0.0240 -0.00343 0.177∗∗ 0.184∗∗
(-0.35) (-0.06) (2.82) (2.97)
Class Size -0.0142 -0.0118 -0.00250 -0.00770
(-1.74) (-1.52) (-0.34) (-1.05)
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Observations 551 567 551 567
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.7: Independent LPM Results, Limited to SUR Sample, With School-
Level FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ind, Beg Ind, Nov Ind, Min-Beg Ind, Min-Nov
Math -0.0200 -0.00891 0.00897 0.0175
(-1.08) (-0.52) (0.53) (1.10)
Reading 0.0293 0.0295 0.00265 0.00564
(1.31) (1.37) (0.13) (0.28)
% Minority -0.0776 -0.196 0.415∗ 0.496∗∗
(-0.43) (-1.16) (2.52) (3.13)
% Females -0.0393 -0.204 0.139 0.0610
(-0.16) (-0.84) (0.61) (0.27)
% Free Lunch 0.0283 -0.0578 -0.105 -0.145
(0.32) (-0.69) (-1.27) (-1.86)
% w/ Older Sib 0.0528 0.0822 0.0526 0.0514
(0.67) (1.07) (0.73) (0.71)
% Mom HS 0.132 -0.0259 -0.0228 -0.0316
(1.36) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.36)
% No Dad -0.0240 -0.00343 0.177∗ 0.184∗
(-0.27) (-0.04) (2.21) (2.35)
Class Size -0.0142 -0.0118 -0.00250 -0.00770
(-1.37) (-1.19) (-0.26) (-0.83)
Constant 0.651∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 0.0304 0.164
(2.54) (4.58) (0.13) (0.76)
Observations 551 567 551 567
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.8: Independent LPM Results, Only White Teachers, School-Level FE,
Full vs. Limited Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginner Novice Beginner Novice
Math -0.00491 -0.0283 -0.00489 -0.0285
(-0.34) (-1.85) (-0.34) (-1.87)
Reading 0.0110 0.0460∗∗ 0.0108 0.0436∗∗
(0.76) (2.80) (0.74) (2.67)
% Minority 0.177 0.250 0.160 0.248
(1.45) (1.96) (1.32) (1.96)
% Females -0.325 -0.330 -0.327 -0.321
(-1.89) (-1.92) (-1.90) (-1.87)
% Free Lunch -0.0257 -0.0368 -0.0196 -0.0201
(-0.37) (-0.54) (-0.29) (-0.30)
Class Size -0.0247∗∗∗ -0.0141∗ -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0138∗
(-3.56) (-2.21) (-3.50) (-2.17)
% w/ Older Sib -0.0202 0.0208
(-0.31) (0.31)
% Mom HS 0.0699 0.000272
(0.61) (0.00)
% No Dad 0.100 0.136
(1.25) (1.63)
Constant 0.926∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(5.01) (4.65) (6.66) (6.05)
Observations 1073 1068 1073 1068
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.9: Independent LPM Results, Beginner vs. Experienced Teachers,
With and Without School-Level FE, Full vs Limited Variabless, 1st Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginner Beginner-FE Beginner Beginner-FE
Math Lag -0.00985 -0.0185 -0.0100 -0.0194
(-1.14) (-1.62) (-1.16) (-1.70)
Read Lag 0.0162 0.0186 0.0132 0.0160
(1.36) (1.14) (1.13) (0.99)
% Minority 0.132∗∗∗ 0.167 0.130∗∗∗ 0.160
(3.58) (1.76) (3.57) (1.69)
% Female 0.0341 0.0985 0.0308 0.103
(0.38) (0.81) (0.34) (0.85)
% Free Lunch -0.0682∗ -0.0734 -0.0446 -0.0504
(-2.15) (-1.70) (-1.48) (-1.20)
Class Size -0.00637∗∗ -0.0109∗ -0.00673∗∗ -0.0114∗∗
(-2.61) (-2.54) (-2.77) (-2.69)
% w/ Older Sib -0.0387 -0.0230
(-1.28) (-0.61)
% Mom HS 0.0216 0.0415
(0.66) (1.04)
% No Dad 0.0673 0.0974∗
(1.84) (2.16)
EPB Lag 0.0448 0.0228
(1.71) (0.72)
IPB Lag -0.00871 0.0170
(-0.29) (0.46)
INT Lag 0.0477 0.0236
(1.19) (0.48)
SC Lag -0.00891 -0.0109
(-0.22) (-0.22)
A2L Lag -0.0327 -0.0125
(-1.08) (-0.34)
Constant 0.448∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗
(4.14) (3.62) (9.09) (7.09)
Observations 2209 2209 2209 2209
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
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Table 3.10: Independent LPM Results, Novice vs. Experienced Teachers, With
and Without School-Level FE, Full vs Limited Variables, 1st Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Novice Novice-FE Novice Novice-FE
Math Lag -0.00675 -0.0123 -0.00845 -0.0145
(-0.79) (-1.09) (-1.00) (-1.29)
Read Lag 0.0154 0.0107 0.0137 0.00772
(1.44) (0.74) (1.30) (0.54)
% Minority 0.143∗∗∗ 0.151 0.144∗∗∗ 0.146
(3.71) (1.52) (3.80) (1.48)
% Female 0.0107 0.102 -0.00155 0.0924
(0.12) (0.82) (-0.02) (0.74)
% Free Lunch -0.00918 -0.0350 -0.00778 -0.0270
(-0.29) (-0.78) (-0.26) (-0.62)
Class Size -0.00359 -0.00748 -0.00398 -0.00802
(-1.44) (-1.69) (-1.61) (-1.82)
% w/ Older Sib -0.0241 -0.0294
(-0.78) (-0.75)
% Mom HS -0.0275 -0.0339
(-0.82) (-0.82)
% No Dad -0.00595 0.0414
(-0.16) (0.89)
EPB Lag 0.0101 -0.000976
(0.37) (-0.03)
IPB Lag 0.0357 0.0551
(1.15) (1.44)
INT Lag 0.0744 0.0570
(1.79) (1.08)
SC Lag -0.0516 -0.0514
(-1.25) (-0.98)
A2L Lag -0.0490 -0.0416
(-1.58) (-1.09)
Constant 0.598∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗
(5.26) (4.55) (9.86) (7.55)
Observations 2186 2186 2186 2186
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.11: Independent LPM Results, Minority vs. White Teachers, With and
Without School-Level FE, Full vs Limited Variables, 1st Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minority Minority-FE Minority Minority-FE
Math Lag 0.0000622 -0.000697 0.00125 0.000231
(0.01) (-0.05) (0.13) (0.02)
Read Lag -0.0189 0.0273 -0.0237 0.0186
(-1.10) (1.15) (-1.40) (0.80)
% Minority 0.139∗ 0.227 0.170∗∗ 0.259
(2.41) (1.59) (2.99) (1.83)
% Female 0.0681 0.126 0.0660 0.147
(0.51) (0.71) (0.49) (0.82)
% Free Lunch -0.0224 0.0209 0.0101 0.0446
(-0.47) (0.32) (0.22) (0.71)
Class Size 0.00175 -0.00285 0.000925 -0.00530
(0.51) (-0.47) (0.27) (-0.88)
% w/ Older Sib -0.133∗∗ -0.178∗∗
(-2.90) (-3.09)
% Mom HS 0.00616 0.00248
(0.13) (0.04)
% No Dad 0.0951 0.0792
(1.86) (1.24)
EPB Lag -0.0174 -0.0366
(-0.46) (-0.78)
IPB Lag 0.0137 0.00819
(0.30) (0.15)
INT Lag -0.0107 -0.00970
(-0.17) (-0.13)
SC Lag 0.0196 0.0474
(0.32) (0.64)
A2L Lag -0.0590 -0.0988
(-1.34) (-1.82)
Constant 0.392∗ 0.483∗ 0.181∗ 0.199
(2.35) (2.30) (2.15) (1.68)
Observations 848 848 848 848
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.12: Simultaneous LPM Results, With School-Level FE, 1st Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SUR, Beg SUR, Nov SUR, Min-Beg SUR, Min-Nov
Math Lag -0.0226 -0.0112 -0.00639 -0.00842
(-1.94) (-0.95) (-0.59) (-0.75)
Read Lag 0.0536∗ 0.0520∗ 0.0493∗ 0.0524∗
(2.40) (2.23) (2.35) (2.42)
% Minority 0.0836 0.115 0.175 0.167
(0.68) (0.87) (1.51) (1.35)
% Female 0.0864 0.167 0.125 0.0541
(0.55) (0.99) (0.84) (0.34)
% Free Lunch -0.118∗ -0.0170 0.0711 0.0480
(-2.08) (-0.28) (1.33) (0.87)
% w/ Older Sib 0.00516 -0.00655 -0.165∗∗∗ -0.127∗
(0.10) (-0.13) (-3.49) (-2.51)
% Mom HS 0.0193 -0.0307 0.00151 0.0135
(0.38) (-0.59) (0.03) (0.27)
% No Dad 0.0552 -0.0473 0.0710 0.00967
(0.99) (-0.81) (1.36) (0.18)
EPB Lag 0.0244 0.00225 -0.0694 -0.0711
(0.61) (0.06) (-1.82) (-1.75)
IPB Lag 0.0633 0.148∗ 0.00905 0.0770
(1.32) (2.77) (0.20) (1.55)
INT Lag 0.0147 0.0701 0.0163 -0.0481
(0.21) (0.98) (0.26) (-0.72)
SC Lag -0.0271 -0.0563 0.0352 0.0559
(-0.43) (-0.82) (0.59) (0.88)
A2L Lag 0.0725 0.0138 -0.115∗ -0.0719
(1.54) (0.28) (-2.60) (-1.54)
Class Size -0.0108∗∗ -0.0111 0.000273 0.00357
(-2.05) (-1.96) (0.06) (0.68)
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Observations 690 613 690 613
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.13: Independent LPM Results, Limited to SUR Sample, With School-
Level FE, 1st Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ind, Beg Ind, Nov Ind, Min-Beg Ind, Min-Nov
Math Lag -0.0226 -0.0112 -0.00639 -0.00842
(-1.51) (-0.73) (-0.46) (-0.59)
Read Lag 0.0536 0.0520 0.0493 0.0524
(1.88) (1.74) (1.84) (1.88)
% Minority 0.0836 0.115 0.175 0.167
(0.53) (0.67) (1.18) (1.05)
% Female 0.0864 0.167 0.125 0.0541
(0.43) (0.77) (0.66) (0.27)
% Free Lunch -0.118 -0.0170 0.0711 0.0480
(-1.62) (-0.22) (1.04) (0.68)
% w/ Older Sib 0.00516 -0.00655 -0.165∗∗ -0.127
(0.08) (-0.09) (-2.73) (-1.96)
% Mom HS 0.0193 -0.0307 0.00151 0.0135
(0.30) (-0.45) (0.02) (0.21)
% No Dad 0.0552 -0.0473 0.0710 0.00967
(0.78) (-0.63) (1.06) (0.14)
EPB Lag 0.0244 0.00225 -0.0694 -0.0711
(0.47) (0.04) (-1.43) (-1.36)
IPB Lag 0.0633 0.148∗∗ 0.00905 0.0770
(1.02) (2.16) (0.16) (1.21)
INT Lag 0.0147 0.0701 0.0163 -0.0481
(0.17) (0.76) (0.20) (-0.56)
SC Lag -0.0271 -0.0563 0.0352 0.0559
(-0.33) (-0.64) (0.46) (0.68)
A2L Lag 0.0725 0.0138 -0.115∗ -0.0719
(1.20) (0.22) (-2.03) (-1.21)
Class Size -0.0108 -0.0111 0.000273 0.00357
(-1.60) (-1.53) (0.04) (0.53)
Constant 0.318 0.362 0.462∗ 0.354
(1.42) (1.47) (2.19) (1.54)
Observations 690 613 690 613
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.14: Independent LPM Results, White Teachers Only, With School-
Level FE, 1st Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginner Novice Beginner Novice
Math Lag -0.0208 -0.0219 -0.0278 -0.0284
(-1.00) (-1.10) (-1.34) (-1.45)
Read Lag 0.00491 -0.00553 -0.00127 -0.00691
(0.22) (-0.29) (-0.06) (-0.37)
% Minority 0.235 0.166 0.225 0.167
(1.78) (1.20) (1.70) (1.21)
% Females 0.159 0.0699 0.137 0.0386
(0.97) (0.42) (0.84) (0.23)
% Free Lunch -0.0198 -0.0224 0.00558 -0.00413
(-0.34) (-0.38) (0.10) (-0.07)
Class Size -0.0114 -0.00775 -0.0123∗ -0.00867
(-1.92) (-1.28) (-2.07) (-1.43)
% w/ Older Sib -0.0446 -0.0660
(-0.89) (-1.28)
% Mom HS 0.0490 -0.0456
(0.90) (-0.81)
% No Dad 0.148∗ 0.114
(2.32) (1.73)
EPB Lag 0.0706 0.0273
(1.62) (0.60)
IPB Lag -0.0139 0.00440
(-0.28) (0.09)
INT Lag 0.0801 0.0354
(1.18) (0.51)
SC Lag -0.00725 -0.0221
(-0.10) (-0.31)
A2L Lag -0.0916 -0.0657
(-1.78) (-1.26)
Constant 0.449∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗
(2.34) (3.77) (4.69) (5.64)
Observations 1365 1424 1365 1424
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.15: Coefficients from Model Used in Prior Studies, Kindergarten
(1) (2) (3)
Pct Minority Pct Females Pct Free Lunch
Beg - Full Sample, FE 0.002 -0.014∗ 0.002
(0.26) (-2.40) (0.10)
Beg - SUR Sample, FE -0.010 -0.009 0.003
(-0.77) (-0.89) (0.11)
Beg - WT Schools, FE 0.009 -0.016∗ -0.004
(0.95) (-2.16) (0.23)
Min - Full Sample, FE 0.033∗ 0.001 -0.007
(2.51) (-.09) (-0.27)
Min - SUR Sample, FE 0.037∗∗ 0.004 0.000
(2.61) (0.39) (0.01)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Each dependent variable is given in the column heading
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
Table 3.16: Coefficients from Model Used in Prior Studies, 1st Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Math Reading PctMinority PctFemales Pct Free Lunch
Beg - Full, FE -0.754∗ -0.718 0.006 -.003 -.009
(-2.20) (-1.86) (1.10) (-0.65) (-0.65)
Beg - SUR, FE -0.121 -0.034 -0.003 -0.000 -0.39
(-0.18) (-0.04) (-0.24) (-0.04) (-1.52)
Beg - WT, FE -1.055∗∗ -1.104∗ 0.013 -0.002 0.009
(-2.60) (-2.47) (1.96) (-0.36) (0.52)
Min - Full, FE 0.024 1.007 0.023∗ .010 0.016
(0.04) (1.58) (2.40) (1.14) (0.69)
Min - SUR, FE 0.105 0.987 0.024 0.013 0.032
(0.15) (1.20) (1.77) (1.23) (1.19)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Each dependent variable is given in the column heading
Beginner teachers are those with three years or less of experience.
Novice teachers are those with seven years or less of experience.
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Table 3.17: Regression of 1st Grade Experience or Minority Status on Resid-
uals Generated Using Kindergarten Coefficients
(1) (2)
Beginner Minority
% Minority -0.113 0.158
(-1.20) (1.13)
% Female -0.309∗∗ -0.231
(-2.58) (-1.31)
% Free Lunch 0.0634 -0.114
(1.49) (-1.80)
% w/ Older Sib 0.00247 0.215∗∗∗
(0.07) (3.86)
% Mom HS 0.0566 -0.00294
(1.45) (-0.05)
% No Dad -0.0768 0.136∗
(-1.75) (2.16)
Class Size -0.0118∗∗ -0.00702
(-2.83) (-1.19)
Constant 0.327∗∗∗ 0.0572
(3.89) (0.46)
Observations 2258 873
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 4
A Closer Look at the Labor Market Benefits of Class Size Reduction
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Introduction
A number of recent papers have used data from the Tennessee STAR exper-
iment to estimate the long-term effects of reduced class sizes on various edu-
cational outcomes. Krueger and Whitmore (2001) show positive but insignificant
effects on eighth-grade test scores and significant effects on both college entrance
test-taking and college entrance exam scores. Finn, Gerber, and Boyd-Zaharias
(2005) find significant impacts on high school graduation. Chetty et al. (2010)
document effects on college attendance, while Dynarksi, Hyman, and Whitmore-
Schanzenbach (2011) find positive impacts on both college attendance and degree
completion. These and other findings have led some to conclude that class size
reduction might be an important tool for improving labor market outcomes and that
these labor market benefits outweigh the costs of the intervention (Krueger and
Whitmore 2001, Schanzenbach 2006, Chetty et al. 2011). Estimates of class
size effects on early test scores also have informed policy that targets funding for
smaller class sizes toward schools serving children from lower-income families.
To determine cost effectiveness, costs of lowering class sizes need to be com-
pared to the monetary benefits. These monetary benefits stemming from changes
in educational outcomes have not been closely scrutinized. In earlier works the
labor market benefits were calculated only by estimating the effect of class size
reduction on test scores and then calculating a corresponding labor market benefit
using a series of assumptions. Now that more information on other outcomes is
available, it seems prudent to compare these estimates based on test scores to
those based on other outcomes and to examine their underlying assumptions. For
example, Krueger and Whitmore (2001) and Schanzenbach (2006) used a bene-
fit multiplier, which relates improvements in test scores to gains in future wages,
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that was larger than later research suggests, and implicitly assumed that effects
were homogenous across races and gender. Both the estimated effects on various
outcomes and estimated returns to education vary substantially across groups, so
these assumptions might overstate the labor market benefits. Moreover, little at-
tention has been paid to the long-term effects of small class size for children from
lower versus middle-income households.
Complicating an analysis of several outcomes is the difficulty in determining
which benefit estimate is appropriate. Many outcomes have been analyzed, and
several, such as college entrance and college degree completion, or test scores
and high school graduation, are likely to be correlated with one another. A typical
analysis might simply choose the largest benefit under the assumption that this
benefit includes all smaller benefits while also including an additional benefit, as
this is the generally-accepted approach. This paper puts forth a basic theoreti-
cal argument for why such a procedure may systematically overestimate benefits,
which was found empirically in Aos et al. (2012). The multiple benefit estimates
are assessed using three approaches: the typical approach, a solution proposed
in Aos et al., and also in terms of an empirically-driven method derived from prior
educational research, so that the various approaches can be compared and as-
sessed for the first time.
The contributions of this paper are several. Most importantly, I show that past
estimates of labor market benefits of small class sizes may be too high, and that it
is very difficult to conclude that such an intervention generates a positive return on
investment when solely considering future wage earnings. While some may argue
that these prior estimates capture benefits not accounted for by other outcomes, I
caution that it instead may be the case that such estimates were actually subject
to the largest error. I also temper earlier research regarding class size reduction
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and high school graduation, demonstrating that the previously-documented effect
might have been an artifact of issues in study implementation and selection of
an inappropriate control group. Finally, I show that labor market benefits accrue
almost exclusively to males.
After a review of the literature and a discussion of the data, prior studies exam-
ining long-term educational benefits will be closely explored. For each outcome,
new estimates of labor market benefits are generated, and the sensitivity to vari-
ous assumptions is tested. A theory outlining why the typical treatment of multiple,
potentially-overlapping benefits may be inappropriate is put forth and the multiple
estimates are then analyzed in light of this theory and Aos et al.’s recent empirical
work. A discussion of the findings follows.
Research on Class Size Reduction
Theories abound as to why students might perform at a higher level if placed
into smaller classes. Some studies suggest that teachers are able to offer better
instruction (Zahorik 1999), but others (Shapson et al. 1980) have refuted this con-
cept. Generally, in fact, class size reductions do not seem to induce detectable
differences in teaching practices (Stasz and Stecher 2002). While other studies
argue that teachers who are responsible for fewer students are able to spend more
time on instruction and less time dealing with behavioral issues (Molnar, Smith, and
Zahorik 1999), perhaps the most convincing research finds that test score gains
may result from teachers being more able to incentivize those students who are
less engaged (Babcock and Betts 2009).
Though the mechanism through which small class sizes act as a catalyst for
improved performance seems to have been identified, the question of whether or
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not reduced class sizes actually are related to an increase in test scores remains
surprisingly unsettled. As Rockoff (2009) notes, class size was the subject of much
inquiry in the early 20th century, with school districts seeking to reduce costs per
pupil. The vast majority of these studies found no negative effect of increasing
class sizes, informing education policy for years to come. Results of later analyses
were decidedly mixed. Glass and Smith (1979) and Slavin (1989) both found posi-
tive impacts of class size reduction, while Robinson and Wittebols (1986) showed
that reduced classes do not necessarily result in improved test scores in general,
even if there are effects in earlier grades and among lower-income students.
Researchers subsequently turned to modern econometric techniques in an at-
tempt to settle the class size debate, with some finding at least some indication that
reduced class sizes may result in test score gains. In their study of Israeli public
schools, Angrist and Lavy (1999) noted a significant increase in test scores due to
small class sizes among fourth and fifth graders, even if the same was not true of
third graders. Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) found positive effects on test scores, but
these were offset by decreases in teacher quality which followed from the hiring of
more teachers in order to reduce class sizes. Dee and West (2011) did not detect
a significant effect overall, though they did note a positive impact on test scores
among students in urban schools.
Still other research found no evidence that class size reduction provided any
significant gain. Hanushek (1997) questioned earlier studies on class size, given
that negative effects of larger teacher-pupil ratios are found nearly as often as
positive effects. Exploiting longitudinal population variations, Hoxby (2000) did not
detect significant effects of reduced class sizes on achievement either. Chingos
(2010) examined the class size reduction initiative in Florida, finding no significant
relationship between class size and test scores. Thus, arguments regarding the
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impact of smaller classes on student test scores remain unsettled.
Perhaps at least partially to blame for the inconsistent findings is that nearly
all of the modern studies were either nonexperimental or, in the case of the meta-
analyses, relied almost exclusively on nonexperimental studies. Due to the reliance
on this framework, much weight has been given to the study with the best design
and implementation. After all, as Krueger (2003) notes, “...one good study can
be more informative than the rest of the literature (p.35).” That study, according
to Krueger, is Tennessee’s Project STAR, an experiment in which students and
teachers were randomly assigned to different sizes of classrooms. In recent years
studies based on STAR data have come to dominate the discussion about small
class sizes due to the experiment’s preeminent status as a controlled, randomized
experiment in class size reduction.
The earliest analyses of STAR data showed a strong relationship between
smaller class sizes and an improvement in student test scores (Word et al. 1990,
Finn and Achilles 1990). While subject to some issues, the general findings have
been confirmed in later studies (Ding and Lehrer 2010, Nye, Hedges, and Kon-
stantopoulos 2000, Krueger 1999) which attempted to mitigate earlier problems.
Though Hanushek, one of the most prominent doubters of class size reduction as
effective policy, cites errors in design and implementation as reason to discount
other studies, even he concludes that there are significant effects from reduced
class sizes in kindergarten and perhaps first grade (1999). Overall, the evidence
from the sole large-scale experiment in this area seems to strongly indicate that
students assigned to smaller classrooms see an improvement in achievement.
It is less clear, though, how the effects of small class sizes might be experienced
in later grades. Some might assume that all learning from one grade persists into
later years (Dieterle et al. 2012), but this isn’t necessarily the case. For exam-
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ple, Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims (2010) show that at least three-quarters of teacher-
induced gains fade out within one year. Additionally, some educational interven-
tions have been demonstrated to produce short-term but not long-term gains, while
others lead to substantial gains that carry over well into the future (Barnett 1995).
As mentioned earlier, a number of studies have used Project STAR data to deter-
mine the long-term effects of small class sizes. Each of these will be discussed in
more detail following a discussion of the Tennessee STAR data.
Data
Tennessee’s Project STAR was a four-year longitudinal experiment carried out
in selected Tennessee schools starting in 1985. The Project followed a single co-
hort of students beginning in kindergarten through their third grade year. Intending
to measure the effects of class size on students, each student was randomly as-
signed to either a small classroom (13-17 students), a regular classroom (22-25
students), or a regular classroom with an aide (22-25 students) (Krueger 1999).
Krueger explores the validity of the random assignment procedure and finds that
the randomization was carried out quite well, with no evidence of sorting of stu-
dents to class type based on observable characteristics. Students were supposed
to be placed into the same type of classroom in all four grades, but this didn’t al-
ways prove to be the case, as will be discussed. To ensure that the study could not
be contaminated by principals’ assignment of teachers to classrooms, this assign-
ment was performed randomly as well.
Every school in Tennessee was invited to be a part of the experiment, of which
180 schools across 50 districts responded with a desire to participate. However,
only 100 of these schools had a sufficient number of kindergarten students to have
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one class of each type, so the remainder of the schools could not be included.
The Tennessee State Department of Education, who provided the funding for the
project, mandated that schools from inner city, suburban, urban, and rural areas
were all included. After taking this direction into account, 79 schools in 42 districts
were ultimately included in the experiment. There was some attrition in the schools,
with only 75 remaining by the conclusion of the experiment (Finn et al. 2007).
The end result was approximately 6,300 students being included in the exper-
iment in kindergarten. Students beginning school in first grade were also ran-
domized into the various class types (Finn et al. 2007). The number of these
students (2,314 (Hanushek 1999)) was quite large, since kindergarten was not
mandatory in Tennessee at the time of the study (Sojourner 2013). Though less
than in first grade, a sizable number of students moved into STAR schools and
were randomized into classrooms in second and third grade, too (1,791 and 1,389
(Hanushek 1999), respectively). The sample was also affected by outward mobil-
ity, with some students moving from one STAR school to another, and with other
students moving out of the study entirely. Students moving between STAR schools
were assigned to the same type of classroom, space permitting. Students mov-
ing from a STAR school to a non-STAR school were not followed. This movement
out of STAR schools did have an effect on class sizes, sometimes resulting in the
’regular’ classrooms actually containing between thirteen and seventeen students.
A relatively limited amount of information was recorded during the study, such
as student demographic variables, achievement test scores, motivation and self-
concept scores, and school and teacher information. Crucial to this study, a sub-
stantial amount of data was added to the student records later on, including infor-
mation on whether or not the student graduated from high school and if they took a
college entrance exam. The high school graduation variable was determined from
90
high school transcripts and the Tennessee State Department of Education (Finn et
al. 2007). For about 57% of students, graduation status could not be ascertained,
and students for which this is true were excluded from the analysis of effects on
high school graduation. Information about college entrance test-taking was added
through a matching process carried out by the organizations which administered
the ACT and SAT tests, as described in Krueger and Whitmore. Some studies on
the long-term effects utilized additional, external data sets which will be described
as part of the in-depth discussion of each paper.
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on Eighth Grade Test
Scores
To begin, the labor market benefits derived from gains in eighth grade test
scores will be considered. Krueger and Whitmore (2001) find a positive but in-
significant impact on eighth grade test scores when using school-by-entry-year
fixed effects. In other words, students are classified based on their initial class-
room size assignment and are compared to the other students in their school co-
hort. This is quite important, since Hanushek (1999) noted that 9-12% of students
switched between class size types each year. It could be the case that students
switching from regular classes into smaller classes in first grade have parents who
differ from the parents of children who did not switch, for example, so this switching
could bias results. However, the use of these school-by-entry-year fixed effects
helps to mitigate this problem. Such a technique has come to be accepted as per-
haps the best for analyzing the STAR data set, with most recent influential papers
utilizing it (see Schanzenbach 2006, Chetty et al. 2011, Dynarski, Hyman, and
Whitmore-Schanzenbach 2012, for example).
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After correcting for this switching issue by using the fixed-effects technique,
Krueger and Whitmore (2001) find that a reduction in class size is associated with
an improvement in eighth-grade test scores of about 1.5%. This figure is not ho-
mogenous across race, with a gain of just over 2% for black students compared
to about 1% for white students. Because numerically-precise estimates were not
given7, and because labor market earnings from test score gains are most often
estimated using standardized test scores, their analysis was replicated using stan-
dardized scores. The model is:
Ai = β0 + β1Xi + β2Ti + i
The vector Xi contains student demographic characteristics including race,
gender, and free lunch eligibility. The dummy variable Ti indicates whether or not
the student was initially assigned into a small class, while Ai is the student’s stan-
dardized test score in either reading or math, or, as in Krueger and Whitmore, the
average of the two scores. Each regression was carried out for all students (Table
4.1), by race (Table 4.2 and Table 4.3), by gender (Table 4.4 and Table 4.5), and by
free lunch eligibility (Table 4.6 and Table 4.7).
The results are not overly surprising. Small class sizes boost test scores by
about one-tenth of a standard deviation. These gains are driven primarily by im-
provements in reading scores. In a departure from Krueger and Whitmore, who
found larger impacts for black students than for whites, here the effect appears
to be roughly constant across races, or perhaps even stronger among white stu-
dents. On the other hand, students who were eligible for free lunch experienced
larger test score gains than did their higher-income peers. Also interesting is the
extent to which boys drive the improvement in math scores, with girls exhibiting
only a tiny, insignificant gain.
7Krueger and Whitmore expressed these results only in graphs
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Of course, primary interest is in the labor market benefits that students might
derive from these test score gains. Following Aos et al., such estimates can be
generated using the formula below:
PV =
∑65
y=age
1.01y−age[(α×.74×β2×ExpectedEarnings)−ExpectedEarnings]
1.03(10+y−age)
First, using a method outlined in Aos et al., expected labor market earnings
are calculated by age for all persons aged 18-65 who attained at least the seventh
grade. This is done both across all students and within race and gender groups,
using data from the 2000 March Current Population Survey, which is when these
students would have graduated from high school. The expected labor market earn-
ings are subsequently inflated by 1% per annum.
Then, test score gains are linked to wage gains by multiplying the inflated ex-
pected labor market earnings by (α + 1), which represents the percent gain in
annual earnings stemming from a one standard deviation increase in standardized
test scores at the conclusion of high school. As one might surmise, the α value
chosen can have a large impact on estimates. If too high of a value is chosen,
the estimated labor market gains will be too high, and if too low of a value is cho-
sen, the estimated labor market gains will subsequently be too low. Both Krueger
and Whitmore (2001) and Schanzenbach (2006) set α = .2, based on Neal and
Johnson’s (1996) work relating AFQT test scores to future labor market earnings.
However, later analyses have suggested much smaller values. Hanushek’s (2009)
survey of the literature led him to conclude that a one standard deviation increase
in math scores corresponds to a 12% increase in earnings, while Aos et al. came
to a similar conclusion, finding a median estimate in the literature of 11.8%. Thus,
setting α = .118 might also be appropriate, perhaps even more so than the .2 value
used in earlier works.
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Since the test scores were observed at the end of eighth grade, and since
induced test score gains often fade over time, they must be adjusted downward to
reflect fadeout in scores between eighth grade and the end of high school. Aos et
al. suggest using a fadeout multiplier of .74, since they find that, on average, 74%
of gains realized in eighth grade persist to the end of twelfth grade.
At this point, the figure described reflects the wage gains from a one standard
deviation increase in test scores observed at the end of eighth grade. To find the
wage gains from small class sizes, then, the figure must by multiplied by β2, which
gives the relationship between assignment into a small class and eighth grade test
scores. Finally, the expected wage gains from the small class assignment are
discounted at a rate of 3% per year back to the point of intervention.
This procedure was carried out across all students and then separately by race
and gender groups. That is, to calculate the expected wage gains for males, for
example, the estimated coefficient from Table 4.4 was multiplied by wage gains
experienced by males for a one standard deviation increase in test scores. Since
an identifier for prior free lunch eligibility is not available in the Current Population
Survey, labor market gains stemming from class size reduction were calculated
by multiplying the coefficients from Tables 4.6 and Tables 4.7 by the overall wage
gains across all student types.
Table 4.8 provides estimates of labor market benefits resulting from class size
reduction’s impact on eighth grade test scores using α values of .118 in column 1
and .20 in column 2. As expected, the estimates using the larger α are substantially
larger. However, even using the higher α value, the estimated benefits are just
under the costs of the program, which Chetty et al. (2011) estimated at $7,508
(adjusted to 2000 dollars)8. Regardless of the specification, it appears as though
8The collection of cost data was not part of the Tennessee STAR design. Chetty et al. estimated
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white students benefit more than blacks, male students more than females, and
low income students more than high income students.
Hypothetically, using the overall measures, found by multiplying the overall labor
market gains by the overall effect, could produce inaccurate estimates. For exam-
ple, if the effect is largest among males, and if labor market returns are largest
among males, then the overall effect might underestimate benefits. An alternative
estimate can be created by calculating a weighted average across race, gender,
and free lunch eligibility based on the proportion of the sample in the respective
group. Carrying this out across races or genders yields estimates that are lower
than the overall estimate for each α value. Performing this calculation by free lunch
eligibility pushes the estimated benefits a bit larger, but they are still lower than the
program costs, as demonstrated in Table 4.9.
Though these measures are all lower than estimates in earlier research, they
may in fact still be too high. Returning to Table 4.1, it is apparent that most of
the test score gains are in reading, with only a smaller improvement in math.
Hanushek’s (2009) estimate of a 12% gain in annual earnings was actually spe-
cific to math scores, based partly on the work of Murnane et al. (2000) who found
that reading scores had no explanatory power on future earnings after controlling
for math scores. As a result, creating a labor market benefit estimate based on
the composite score might grossly exaggerate benefits. Column 3 of Table 4.8 pro-
vides estimates of benefits for all students and by race and gender when calculated
based only on math scores.
Total estimated benefits are now much lower, at only $2,495, as shown in col-
umn 3 of Table 4.8. Perhaps the most striking result is that girls receive almost no
benefit. Calculating benefits by race, gender, or free lunch eligibility and then tak-
the cost of class size reduction to be $9,355 in 2009 dollars
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ing a weighted average yields results that are slightly larger, but still far, far below
earlier estimates, and far below the cost threshold. Thus, though several estimates
of total labor market benefits were generated, none of those based on eighth grade
test scores were larger than the costs of the intervention.
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on Entrance Exam Scores
Krueger and Whitmore (2001) also looked at the effect of class size reduction
on college entrance exam scores, which they ultimately used for estimating labor
market benefits. For this model, they used school fixed effects instead of school-
by-entry year fixed effects. However, in this analysis, school-by-entry-year fixed
effects will still be used for consistency. Cognizant of the fact that small classes
apparently spurred more students to take a college entrance test, and that these
marginal test-takers might be weaker than the average student, they used both a
linear truncation and Heckman correction method to try to compensate for potential
selection. Results were fairly consistent under either specification.
The Heckman procedure may be problematic since it is not possible to esti-
mate a probit model with fixed effects. The linear truncation method rests on the
questionable assumption that the additional students taking the exam due to small
classes are exclusively the lowest-scoring students. Thus, the linear truncation
method provides sort of an upper bound. The model is similar to before:
Ci = β0 + β1Xi + β2Ti + i
The college entrance score is denoted by Ci. For most students, this is their
standardized ACT score, but for a small number who took only the SAT exam, it is
their SAT score converted to the ACT scale, using a table provided by The College
Board, and subsequently standardized (Krueger and Whitmore 2001). When using
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linear truncation, the equation is estimated excluding the lowest-scoring students
who were randomized into a small class such that the proportion of students taking
the exam is equal across the treatment and control groups.
I am mostly able to replicate Krueger and Whitmore’s results, as demonstrated
in Table 4.12, Table 4.13, Table 4.14, and Table 4.15. Small classes appear to
lead to an increase of .18 standard deviations in college exam scores across all
students. This effect is quite heterogenous, however. Male, black, and low-income
students derive substantial gains, while female, white, and higher-income students
receive a smaller benefit. Small discrepancies may arise from the fact that I contin-
ued to utilize school-by-entry year fixed effects rather than switching to the school
fixed effects they used.
Krueger and Whitmore then performed a procedure similar to what I carried
out with eighth grade test scores, using an α value of .2, as noted earlier. One
important deviation from before is that a fadeout multiplier is not necessary, as the
scores were observed at the conclusion of high school. Table 4.8 presents results
from ACT scores using an α value of .118 in column 4, and of .2 in column 5. When
using ACT scores, the overall benefit is substantially above the estimated cost,
regardless of which α value is used. Due to the large labor market gains exhibited
among male, black, and low-income students, column 4 of Table 4.10 shows that
the weighted averages exclusively show a positive return on investment.
But, as with eighth grade test scores, it may not be appropriate to apply the
composite ACT score to expected earning gains. While Neal and Johnson’s deriva-
tion of the relationship between score gains and earnings used the AFQT, which is
a similarly-composite score, other studies have failed to find that gains in subjects
other than math actually matter. Table 4.15 shows that gains in ACT test scores
are fairly constant across subjects, with math gains actually being nearly tied with
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science gains as the largest. Still, though, it isn’t clear whether or not these gains
in other subjects actually matter.
Column 6 of Table 4.8 presents estimates from using only the ACT math scores
and an α value of .118. Of course, given the much smaller effect size, the estimated
benefits are much lower than before. Driven by the large math score improvements
by males and their high returns to education, the weighted average based on gen-
der is slightly below the estimated costs. Based on gains in ACT scores, then,
there is some evidence that the labor market benefits of small class sizes exceed
the cost, but overall the results are mixed. This is interesting considering that these
mixed results were calculated when assessing the benefits at the upper bounds of
the effect sizes. In other words, the benefits calculated at the upper bounds are
still only sometimes larger than the costs.
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on High School Gradua-
tion
High school graduation is another outcome that has been linked to small class
size. While this link should be treated with caution due to the prevalence of miss-
ing data with respect to the high school graduation outcome, perhaps the most
significant contribution in this area comes from Finn, Gerber, and Boyd-Zaharias
(2005). Using hierarchical linear models to analyze Tennessee Project STAR data,
they find that three or more years of smaller classes increases the chances that
a student graduates high school. However, they did not account for the issues in
implementation noted by Hanushek (1999). Most importantly, Finn, Gerber, and
Boyd-Zaharias did not consider that 9-12% of students switched between class
size types each year, and perhaps didn’t use an appropriate control group. Thus,
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the observed increase in graduation might truly only be reflective of unobserved
differences in family or other characteristics.
I replicated this analysis both with and without the school-by-entry-year fixed
effects designed to alleviate the switching problem using a simple logit model:
HSi = β0 + β1Xi + β23Y RSi + i
HSi is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the student graduated high
school, Xi is again a vector of individual-level characteristics, and 3Y RSi is a
dummy variable set to 1 if a student was randomized into a small classroom and
remained in one for at least three years.
Column 1 of Table 4.19 shows positive impact of three years of small class sizes
on high school graduation noted in Finn, Gerber, and Boyd-Zaharias. This model,
though, compares students who experienced three years of small classes, and
thus typically didn’t switch schools or otherwise exit the study, to all other students
who were assigned to regular classrooms. Column 2 restricts the sample to only
those students who were in a Project STAR school for at least three years. This
greatly reduces the coefficient, leading one to believe that differences in student
mobility may be partly behind the earlier findings.
In column 3, the sample is no longer restricted to only those students who were
in a Project STAR school for at least three years, but school-by-entry-year fixed
effects are added in. Compared to column 1, it appears as though a substantial
portion of this effect may be due to between-school variation, too. The coefficient
further shrinks in column 4, when the sample is again restricted and fixed effects
are imposed. The effect all but disappears using the preferred specification based
on initial assignment and using fixed effects in column 5. Indeed, the p-value (.56)
is nowhere near statistical significance.
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As with test scores, these effects are broken down by race, gender, and income.
For the purpose of comparison with other outcomes to be discussed, linear prob-
ability models will be used here instead of a logistic regression as in Table 4.19.
Table 4.20, Table 4.21, and Table 4.22 provide the LPM results for all students as
well as broken down by student type. As one would expect, the effect is still far
from significance when utilizing the linear probability model. When breaking down
the students by gender, race, or income, the effect on high school graduation is still
not significant for any group. A pattern is perhaps beginning to emerge, though, as
males again appear to receive a much larger benefit than females.
Benefits from high school graduation or other attainment outcomes were cal-
culated using data from the 2000 March Current Population Survey, similar to the
benefits from test scores. Mean earnings for both those attaining a certain level
and those not attaining that level but at least completing seventh grade were cal-
culated separately for each age 18-65. Wages were again inflated by 1%, and
the difference in wages was discounted at a 3% annual rate. These discounted
sums of the growth-inflated differences were then added together to determine the
present value. Expressed mathematically,
PV =
∑65
y=age
InflatedAttainedEarnings−InflatedNotAttainedEarnings
1.03(10+y−age)
This present value was calculated for all persons, and separately by both race
and gender, and then the relevant present values were multiplied by the corre-
sponding group-specific coefficients. This allows for the calculation of labor market
benefits for males and females independently, for example. Following this method
the overall labor market benefit estimate is slightly less than half of the estimated
cost, as demonstrated in column 7 of Table 4.8. The weighted average by race is
lower, while the weighted average by gender and income are both slightly larger.
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However, even these are well below the cost. Thus, there is little evidence to
suggest that randomization into a small classroom generates a positive return on
investment when measured through high school graduation.
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on College Attendance
Another major study looking at a long-term outcome is that of Chetty et al.
(2011). They determined whether or not a Project STAR student attended college
by matching students to 1098-T forms provided to them by the IRS. Such forms
report tuition payments and scholarships received, and so every student attending
a college, university, vocational school, or other postsecondary institution receives
a 1098-T. They find that black and free lunch eligible students are more likely to at-
tend college on time and attend college by age 27. White students are found to be
more likely to attend college on time but less likely to attend college by 27, though
neither of the results with respect to white students are statistically significant. As
with math test scores and high school graduation, males experience a much larger
positive impact from class size reduction, as they are 2.3% more likely to attend
college by 27, compared with about .5% for females.
The labor market benefits from college attendance were estimated in a way that
is quite similar to how the benefits from high school were estimated. Again utiliz-
ing the 2000 March Current Population Survey, mean earnings for those having
attended some college and for those who never attended college were computed
by age for all persons 18-65. After inflating wages and discounting the differences
as before, the differences were again summed together to find the present value of
college attendance, and this figure was multiplied by the corresponding regression
coefficient to estimate the gains resulting from class size reduction. The results
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from this exercise are presented in column 2 of Tables 4.9 and 4.11. Using the
typical method, the overall benefit is only $4,685. Continuing the pattern, males
appear to receive a much larger benefit in terms of future wage gains than do
females.
When carrying out the estimation based on the weighted average approach by
income, an estimate of $9,191 is generated. Thus, such an analysis provides an-
other avenue for finding a benefit estimate that exceeds the costs. However, the
weighted averages based on race or gender are only $4,642 and $4,815, respec-
tively.
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on Noncognitive Scores
Chetty et al. generate an estimate of the benefits of class size reduction based
on effects on kindergarten test scores. They consider the relationship between test
score gains from improvements in classroom quality and future earnings, and then
assume that the relationship between score gains from class size reduction and
future earnings is similar. This is a perfectly reasonable assumption, but perhaps
could be examined in light of their findings with respect to fadeout and noncognitive
scores.
Given that the cognitive gains from reduced class sizes start to diminish quite
quickly, and yet students in small class sizes exhibit improvements in a variety of
later life outcomes, Chetty et al. hypothesize that gains in noncognitive areas may
play a role. It could be the case that noncognitive scores do not fade out and are
simply not observed until they arise again through outcomes such as college at-
tendance. Luckily, the STAR data contain information on fourth grade noncognitive
scores, and Chetty et al. provide information about the relationship between these
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scores and future earnings. It is therefore possible to estimate the impact of small
classes on noncognitive scores and then to generate an estimate of labor market
benefits based on this effect.
Fourth grade teachers in STAR classrooms rated a subsample of students with
respect to their behavior. These scores were then combined into standardized
scores in four areas: effort, initiative, nonparticipatory behavior, and how much the
student values the class. Chetty et al. generated percentile ranks for each of the
four scores and then calculated the average to create a noncognitive index. The
same procedure was followed here. The effect of assignment into a small class on
the noncognitive index is given in Tables 4.23, 4.24, and 4.25.
Small class sizes appear to have significant and positive impact on fourth grade
noncognitive scores. Male and female students experience similar gains, but black
students receive much larger benefits than do white students. Especially in light
of the disparity in effect sizes by race, it may be surprising that the effect is quite
homogenous by income.
To convert these scores to a lifetime earnings benefit, I note that Chetty et al.
found that a one percentile increase in the noncognitive index relates to a $106 gain
in age 27 earnings. Adjusting earnings up or down by 1% annually and then dis-
counting by 3% yields a lifetime earnings benefit of $2,264 per percentile increase
in the noncognitive scores. Multiplying the per-percentile gain by the overall gain of
roughly 1.5% results in a labor market benefit of $3,596 coming from noncognitive
scores, again much smaller than the costs. Gains by race, gender, and income are
provided in column 3 of Table 4.9, and the weighted average results are presented
in column 3 of Table 4.11.
Of course, some might argue that gains from noncognitive scores are at least
somewhat independent of gains from cognitive scores. Fortunately, evidence in
103
Chetty et al. allows one to determine how much the combination of noncognitive
and cognitive scores might impact future earnings. When regressing both types
of scores on future wages they find that a one percentile increase in noncognitive
scores relates to about an $88 increase in earnings, and a one percentile increase
in math and reading scores corresponds to a gain of just over $34. Table 4.26,
Table 4.27, and Table 4.28 shows the relationship between the percentile combined
math and reading score and assignment to small classes.
Under this formulation, the labor market benefits from a one percentile increase
in noncognitive scores is worth about $1,874, and the same increase in cognitive
scores equates to about $735. Multiplying these amounts by the respective effect
sizes and then summing them together still provides an estimate that is far below
the estimated costs, though the weighted average based on race does come a bit
closer to the costs.
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on Degree Completion
Dynarski, Hyman, and Whitmore Schanzenbach (2011) carry out an analysis
similar to Chetty et al.’s, but with a different external data set. They instead match
the STAR sample to data from the National Student Clearinghouse, which is an
organization that keeps track of college student enrollment for the purpose of de-
termining whether or not student loans should be in deferment or not. Their findings
are similar to those in Chetty et al. in that black students placed into small classes
are more likely to attend college then those placed into regular classes. Further,
they find a significant positive impact on degree completion, though this effect does
not vary substantially by race. As one might have come to expect, the impact on
college attendance is larger for males than females. Results for degree completion
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by gender and income are not available.
Column 5 of Table 4.9 provides estimates of labor market benefits derived from
obtaining a college degree. Utilizing a procedure much in line with that used to
estimate the labor market gains from college attendance, mean earnings by age
for persons 18-65 were calculated for persons attaining a college degree and for
those not attaining a college degree using data from the 2000 March Current Popu-
lation Survey. Wages were inflated by 1% annually and the differences were again
discounted by 3%. Once the estimated gains from degree completion were com-
puted, they were multiplied by the effect size found in Dynarski, Hyman, and Whit-
more Schanzenbach to estimate the labor market benefits from small class size.
The estimated impact here is slightly larger than when looking only at college at-
tendance, at $5,111. Notably, the benefit is pretty equally distributed across races,
in contrast to gains from college attendance. Once again, there is little evidence
that the labor market benefits from class size reduction exceed the cost.
Evaluating Labor Market Benefits Experienced Through Multiple
Avenues
There are clear and positive impacts on wages from small class sizes. However,
we are interested not in whether the intervention produces results but whether or
not the benefits outweigh the costs. Chetty et al. (2011) calculated the costs of
2.14 years9 of small classes to be $7,508 per student, so developing an accurate
estimate is very important in determining whether or not the policy generates a
positive return on investment.
Following conventional methods, a researcher might choose $19,016 as the
9The average number of years of small classes experienced by students initially randomized into
a small class was 2.14.
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estimate of labor market gains from class size reduction, as it is the largest benefit
calculated in the typical way of multiplying the overall effect by the overall labor
market gains. The reasoning behind such an approach is motivated by the idea
that a gain in one outcome, such as college entrance exam test scores, might
manifest itself as an improvement in another outcome, like college attendance, and
so summing the two benefits together would result in a double-counting. Since
the benefit from the exam scores is largest, it may be assumed that this benefit
includes both those benefits from college as well as some marginal benefits. Aos
et al. (2012), though, maintain that this strategy overestimates benefits. While they
established their finding empirically through Monte Carlo simulations, no known
theoretical basis for the systematic overestimation exists. Though straightforward,
it may be prudent to put forth a basic argument.
Suppose that we wish to consider N different outcomes, (O1,...,ON ) and sup-
pose that the true labor market benefit of each is (B1,...,BN ), respectively. Assume
that the benefits are ordered smallest to largest. Further suppose that the bene-
fits of smaller outcomes are always entirely captured by all larger outcomes. Of
course, we don’t know (B1,...,BN ), and instead can only find the estimate of each,
(Bˆ1,...,BˆN ). For illustration, assume that the estimated benefits are normally dis-
tributed, though this argument can easily be extended to other symmetric distribu-
tions.
Under this assumption, P (BˆN >BN ) = .5, and P (BˆN <BN) = .5. This exhausts
the possibilities for underestimation, but not for overestimation. After estimating
benefits for each outcome, it could be the case that ˆBN−1 exceeds BˆN . A re-
searcher would then choose ˆBN−1 as the largest, viewing it as an estimate of BN .
Formally, we must add P ( ˆBN−1 >BN) to our probability of overestimation. Under
the normality assumption, this probability is
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1 - 1√
2pi
∫ BN−BN−1σN−1
−∞ e
t2
2 dt
The expression is always positive, leading to overestimation bias whenever
more than one alternative is estimated. It is decreasing in BN − BN−1 and in-
creasing in σN−1. Thus, as the true benefits grow closer together, and as the error
of the smaller benefit increases, the probability of overestimation increases.
Of course, the probability is also positive for all other alternatives, and so the
total probability of overestimation is
.5 + P (Bˆ1>BN) + ... + P ( ˆBN−1 >BN)
The smaller the distance between true benefits and the larger the error of each,
the greater the probability of overestimation. Further, since each term is positive,
the probability is also increasing in N, the number of outcomes evaluated. It is ap-
parent, then, that such an approach might routinely overestimate benefits, which
is exactly what Aos et al. found. In the working example, it seems at least pos-
sible that the estimate based on the composite college entrance exam scores is
measured with considerable error, and so the probability of overestimating benefits
may be substantially greater than .5.
To correct for the overestimation bias, Aos et al. propose using an average of
benefit estimates weighted by sample size.
∑N
1
Sn
S1+...+SN
Bˆn
In the formula above, Sn is the effective sample size for outcome n. Even though
all of the estimates in this case use the same sample, the sample sizes differ
considerably. For example, many fewer students are in the sample of those taking
a college entrance exam. Effective sample sizes for each outcome are given in
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Table 11. Since sample sizes are not available by race and gender in Chetty et al.,
this approach can only be applied to the overall effects.
The correction in Aos et al. was applied to the multiple benefit estimates found
in the present study. First, the correction was carried out using estimates that were
calculated with an α value of .12 to generate a more conservative estimate. Doing
so yields an estimate of $4,659. To provide a more liberal estimate of benefits
while still utilizing the correction methodology, the procedure was subsequently
carried out using those estimates calculated with an α value of .20. Allowing for
the higher α value results in an estimate of $6,061. Regardless of the α value
utilized, the corrected benefit estimates are still far below the estimated costs of
the intervention.
A Marginal Effects Approach to Evaluating Multiple Labor Mar-
ket Benefits
While the method presented in Aos et al. may help guard against estimation
errors, it is not clear that it is necessarily the best method. Both the conventional
method and the Aos et al. method suppose that there is some sort of basic re-
lationship between two outcomes. For example, both assume that labor market
earnings will increase based on college attendance primarily because many of
those beginning college will earn a degree. Thus, both college attendance and
college completion measure similar outcomes, although one does so more directly.
In the conventional method, we assume both are the most accurate estimates pos-
sible and that the larger benefit essentially contains the smaller. In the Aos et al.
method, we suppose that both are measured with error and therefore simply take
the average of the two in order to reduce the potential for that error.
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But these approaches may be missing the greater story that these various out-
comes tell. In some cases, such as this one, we have additional information about
marginal effects. For example, we have information about both college attendance
and degree completion. One must attend college to complete a degree, and so ob-
taining a degree provides a marginal benefit, distinct from that derived from simply
attending college.
It could be the case that small class sizes push certain groups of students to
begin college but then drop out. In fact, that’s exactly what the evidence indicates.
Black students assigned to small classes are 5.3% more likely to attend college but
only about 1.6% more likely to attain a degree. In other words, small class sizes
have the effect of inducing about 3.7% more black students to attend college but
not complete a degree. Therefore, we should perhaps not average these effects
together but instead sum the benefit from being a college drop out with the benefit
from completing a degree.
For all students, and for each group, the increase in the probability that a stu-
dent attends college but does not complete a degree can be calculated by taking
the effect with respect to college attendance and then subtracting off the effect of
obtaining a degree. Labor market benefits can be calculated in a way similar to
before, but while comparing persons with a given level of attainment to the relevant
step below. For example, the wage benefit from obtaining some college would be
derived from looking at the wages of persons attaining some college compared to
persons who have graduated high school, rather than comparing these persons to
the entire population that has attained at least the seventh grade.
While exploring the marginal effect of college degree completion conditional
on attending college is conceptually straightforward, the marginal effect of degree
completion conditional on test score gains perhaps isn’t so simple. Fortunately,
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Murnane et al. (2000) show that about one-third of the earnings gains from in-
creases in test scores come through the additional probability of obtaining a col-
lege degree, conditional upon graduating high school. We are still left with the
puzzle, though, of determining how test scores relate to high school graduation
and attending some college.
The high school graduation part is straightforward. The results in Table 4.30,
Table 4.31, Table 4.32 show that reduced class sizes have no impact on high school
graduation after conditioning upon eighth grade test scores, which also would have
been impacted by the class size reduction. While it could be argued that high
school graduation is impacted by skills that don’t show up in cognitive tests, the
best assumption to be made while working with the available information is to dis-
regard any gains from graduation and instead count the test score gains fully.
The effect on college attendance conditional upon eighth grade test scores is
still unknown. To be overly generous, I will assume that the labor market benefits
from attending some college are completely independent of both test scores and
degree completion so they were not captured by Murnane et al.
Labor market benefits can thus be calculated as
(2 / 3) ×M1 + (1 / 3) ×M2 + M3
where M1 are the labor market gains from test scores, M2 from a college degree,
after controlling for test scores, and M3 from attending some college. Table 4.33
provides estimates for each different test score outcome both by using the conven-
tional method and the weighted average procedure. Only those estimates using
the composite ACT score, evaluated at the upper bound and using the α value of
.2 or above exceed the cost of the intervention.
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Discussion
All told, 41 estimates of the overall labor market benefits from class size re-
duction based on individual educational outcomes were generated throughout the
course of this study. Two estimates were calculated using the method in Aos et
al., and another 12 were derived from a new approach developed from past re-
search on the relationship between test scores, college degree completion, and
labor market earnings. Of these, only ten of them were larger than $7,508, which
is the cost of the program estimated by Chetty et al. (2011). Of the ten benefit
estimates that exceeded the costs , nine of them used ACT scores evaluated by
way of a linear truncation procedure which produces an upper bound. Beyond es-
timates generated using ACT scores, only a weighted average approach based on
free lunch eligibility and using college attendance as an outcome resulted in an
estimate larger than the costs. The estimated benefits do not exceed the costs
when measured by any other method or outcome.
Certainly, the results indicate that researchers should be hesitant to accept
the idea that class size reduction delivers a positive return on investment. After
all, it is only possible to arrive at such a conclusion when using the most liberal
assumptions possible. While it could be the case that the most liberal assumptions
result in the most accurate assessment of labor market gains, such a scenario
seems a bit unlikely.
It is absolutely crucial to point out that this does not mean that small class
sizes do not generate a positive return. Rather, this study only indicates that the
benefits in terms of wages alone might not outweigh the cost. Though limited in
scope, Schanzenbach (2006) found significant reductions in crime from small class
sizes, which creates substantial savings in terms of incarceration and other costs.
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Further, this analysis did not consider non-cash benefits. Aos et al. estimate non-
cash benefits at 33% of annual wages. The inclusion of these benefits in a similar
cost-benefit analysis of class size reduction would shift benefit estimates upward,
with more of the estimates being greater than the costs. Nonetheless, many of
the estimates would still be below the costs, so there would still be considerable
uncertainty regarding whether or not the intervention generates a positive return.
Conclusion
This paper has contributed to the existing literature in a number of ways. First
and foremost, this study has illustrated the uncertainty regarding the labor market
benefits of class size reduction, and forces researchers to approach estimates of
high labor market returns with some degree of skepticism. Second, this inquiry
has noted that the relationship between class size and high school graduation is
actually quite weak, and that previous findings resulted from problems in the imple-
mentation of the STAR experiment and subsequent analysis. Third, a theoretical
argument as to why choosing the largest benefit in a cost-benefit analysis will sys-
tematically overestimate benefits was presented. Finally, this is the first paper to
point out that, even if there are large-enough gains from class size reduction, they
appear to accrue primarily to males. Taking this evidence as a whole, it seems as
though further research should be considered before class size reduction initiatives
are carried out in the future.
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Tables
Table 4.1: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on Eighth-Grade Test Scores, All
Students
(1) (2) (3)
Combined Math Reading
Small Class 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0550 0.138∗∗∗
(3.36) (1.75) (4.39)
Male -0.0835∗∗∗ -0.0958∗∗∗ -0.0786∗∗
(-3.42) (-3.51) (-2.87)
Black -0.377∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗
(-7.26) (-5.40) (-7.32)
Free Lunch -0.374∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
(-10.04) (-9.16) (-8.85)
Constant 0.341∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(9.18) (8.37) (7.78)
Observations 4439 4473 4481
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.2: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on Eighth-Grade Test Scores, Black
Students
(1) (2) (3)
Black - Combined Black - Math Black - Reading
Small Class 0.0773 0.0636 0.101
(1.69) (1.26) (1.96)
Male -0.0593 -0.0861∗ -0.0455
(-1.56) (-2.07) (-1.06)
Free Lunch -0.329∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗
(-3.49) (-2.66) (-3.59)
Constant -0.157 -0.154 -0.166
(-1.68) (-1.50) (-1.57)
Observations 1719 1744 1743
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
Table 4.3: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on Eighth-Grade Test Scores, White
Students
(1) (2) (3)
White - Combined White - Math White - Reading
Small Class 0.102∗∗ 0.0529 0.155∗∗∗
(2.80) (1.28) (3.80)
Male -0.0913∗∗ -0.0951∗∗ -0.0907∗
(-2.81) (-2.60) (-2.50)
Free Lunch -0.377∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗
(-8.93) (-8.19) (-7.79)
Constant 0.390∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(11.06) (10.24) (9.38)
Observations 2720 2729 2738
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.4: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on Eighth-Grade Test Scores, Boys
(1) (2) (3)
Boys - Combined Boys - Math Boys - Read
Small Class 0.0975∗ 0.0834 0.122∗
(2.09) (1.60) (2.37)
Black -0.396∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗
(-4.65) (-3.36) (-4.69)
Free Lunch -0.388∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗
(-6.34) (-5.57) (-6.10)
Constant 0.260∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(4.57) (3.68) (4.35)
Observations 2093 2112 2110
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
Table 4.5: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on Eighth-Grade Test Scores, Girls
(1) (2) (3)
Girls - Combined Girls - Math Girls - Read
Small Class 0.0697 0.00948 0.128∗∗
(1.96) (0.24) (3.16)
Black -0.347∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗
(-5.14) (-3.81) (-5.12)
Free Lunch -0.361∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗
(-7.89) (-7.31) (-6.53)
Constant 0.339∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(7.62) (7.16) (6.03)
Observations 2346 2361 2371
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.6: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on Eighth-Grade Test Scores, Free
Lunch Eligible
(1) (2) (3)
Eligible - Combined Eligible - Math Eligible - Read
Small Class 0.101∗∗ 0.0489 0.161∗∗∗
(2.86) (1.24) (4.08)
Black -0.347∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(-5.89) (-4.15) (-6.22)
Male -0.0922∗∗ -0.0959∗∗ -0.0994∗∗
(-3.08) (-2.89) (-2.98)
Constant -0.108∗∗ -0.123∗∗ -0.107∗∗
(-2.95) (-3.00) (-2.61)
Observations 3254 3286 3291
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
Table 4.7: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on Eighth-Grade Test Scores, Free
Lunch Ineligible
(1) (2) (3)
Ineligible - Combined Ineligible - Math Ineligible - Read
Small Class 0.0757 0.0728 0.0779
(1.61) (1.36) (1.45)
Black -0.519∗∗∗ -0.496∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗
(-4.05) (-3.41) (-3.66)
Male -0.0738 -0.107∗ -0.0400
(-1.73) (-2.20) (-0.82)
Constant 0.527∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(15.57) (14.50) (12.67)
Observations 1185 1187 1190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.8:
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on Test Scores, Discounted to Point of Intervention
(in 2000 dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
8th, All 8th, All 8th, Math ACT, All ACT, All ACT, Math
α=.118 α=.20 α=.118 α=.118 α=.20 α=.118
All 4,291 7,274 2,495 11,219 19,016 1,937
Black 2,878 4,879 2,368 15,700 26,610 7,598
White 4,832 8,189 2,506 2,089 3,540 6,000
Male 5,884 9,972 5,033 20,469 34,693 17,125
Female 2,311 3,917 314 5,253 8,886 -3,781
Eligible 4,582 7,766 2,218 13,488 22,861 6,000
Ineligible 3,434 5,820 3,302 4,604 7,804 49
Table 4.9:
Labor Market Benefit Estimates Based on Other Outcomes, Discounted to Point of
Intervention (in 2000 dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HS Grad Col Att 4th, 4th, Cog Col Deg
Noncog +Noncog
All 3,634 4,686 3,595 5,288 5,111
Black 3,311 13,513 5,784 10,613 4,976
White 2,337 -508 2,652 4,507 4,919
Male 11,283 8,216 3,920 5,863
Female -1,391 1,002 4,127 6,538
Eligible 4,013 11,664 5,617 7,676
Ineligible 2,550 -2,728 1,330 4,150
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Table 4.10:
Labor Market Benefits Based on Test Scores, Weighted Average Approach, Discounted to
Point of Intervention (in 2000 dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
8th, All 8th, All 8th, Math ACT, All ACT, All ACT, Math
α=.118 α=.20 α=.118 α=.118 α=.20 α=.118
All - by Race 4,114 6,973 2,455 8,006 13,570 2,033
All - by Gender 4,199 7,117 2,808 13,289 22,525 7,267
All - by Eligibility 4,385 7,432 2,404 10,380 17,593 4,970
Table 4.11:
Labor Market Benefits Based on Other Outcomes, Weighted Average Approach,
Discounted to Point of Intervention (in 2000 dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HS Grad Col Att 4th, 4th, Cog
Noncog +Noncog
All - by Race 2,694 4,642 3,802 6,750
All - by Gender 5,407 4,815 4,017 6,182
All - by Eligibility 3,762 9,192 4,881 5,576
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Table 4.12: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on ACT Scores by Gender
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Small Class 0.183∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.117∗
(4.45) (3.58) (2.23)
Male 0.0546
(1.51)
Black -0.501∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗
(-6.37) (-3.94) (-4.28)
Free Lunch -0.265∗∗∗ -0.150 -0.332∗∗∗
(-5.32) (-1.73) (-5.39)
Constant 0.226∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(4.98) (2.77) (4.92)
Observations 2421 989 1432
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.13: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on ACT Scores by Race
(1) (2) (3)
All Black White
Small Class 0.183∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.0553
(4.45) (4.87) (1.05)
Male 0.0546 0.0441 0.0463
(1.51) (0.82) (0.97)
Black -0.501∗∗∗
(-6.37)
Free Lunch -0.265∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(-5.32) (-4.05) (-3.79)
Constant 0.226∗∗∗ -0.194∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(4.98) (-1.97) (5.65)
Observations 2421 845 1605
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.14: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on ACT Scores by Free Lunch
Eligibility
(1) (2) (3)
All Eligible Ineligible
Small Class 0.183∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ -0.0751
(4.45) (4.12) (-1.12)
Male 0.0546 0.0772 -0.0133
(1.51) (1.64) (-0.22)
Black -0.501∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗
(-6.37) (-5.64) (-2.80)
Free Lunch -0.265∗∗∗
(-5.32)
Constant 0.226∗∗∗ -0.0998 0.317∗∗∗
(4.98) (-1.77) (6.83)
Observations 2421 1443 1029
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.15: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on ACT Subject Scores, All Stu-
dents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACT Math ACT English ACT Reading ACT Science
Small Class 0.0814 0.0653 0.0622 0.0821
(1.91) (1.91) (1.91) (1.91)
Male 0.253∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(6.68) (6.68) (6.68) (6.68)
Black -0.518∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗
(-6.23) (-6.23) (-6.23) (-6.23)
Free Lunch -0.153∗∗ -0.123∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.154∗∗
(-2.93) (-2.93) (-2.93) (-2.93)
Constant 0.0611 -0.0762∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗
(1.29) (-2.00) (-4.68) (-3.02)
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2378
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.16: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on ACT Math Scores by Gender
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Small Class 0.0814 0.243∗∗ -0.0299
(1.91) (3.25) (-0.56)
Male 0.253∗∗∗
(6.68)
Black -0.518∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗
(-6.23) (-5.04) (-2.86)
Free Lunch -0.153∗∗ 0.0229 -0.246∗∗∗
(-2.93) (0.24) (-3.90)
Constant 0.0611 0.225∗∗ 0.0804
(1.29) (3.05) (1.41)
Observations 2378 971 1409
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.17: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on ACT Math Scores by Race
(1) (2) (3)
All Black White
Small Class 0.0814 0.216∗∗ -0.0187
(1.91) (3.24) (-0.34)
Male 0.253∗∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(6.68) (2.15) (5.92)
Black -0.518∗∗∗
(-6.23)
Free Lunch -0.153∗∗ -0.332∗∗ -0.113
(-2.93) (-3.19) (-1.80)
Constant 0.0611 -0.314∗∗ 0.0607
(1.29) (-3.09) (1.38)
Observations 2378 834 1572
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.18: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on ACT Math Scores by Free
Lunch Eligibility
(1) (2) (3)
All Eligible Ineligible
Small Class 0.0814 0.0959 0.000795
(1.91) (1.84) (0.01)
Male 0.253∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(6.68) (5.95) (3.36)
Black -0.518∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -0.483∗
(-6.23) (-6.42) (-2.50)
Free Lunch -0.153∗∗
(-2.93)
Constant 0.0611 -0.140∗ 0.154∗∗
(1.29) (-2.51) (3.21)
Observations 2378 1411 1005
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.19: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on High School Graduation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All 3 Yrs STAR All, FE 3 Yrs STAR, FE Preferred
3Yrs+ Small 0.425∗∗∗ 0.141 0.215 0.0762
(3.58) (1.10) (1.66) (0.55)
Male -0.601∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗ -0.725∗∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗
(-7.36) (-6.18) (-6.71) (-5.73) (-6.71)
Black -0.272∗∗ -0.280∗ 0.344 0.510 0.356
(-3.24) (-2.30) (1.88) (1.74) (1.94)
Free Lunch -2.013∗∗∗ -1.772∗∗∗ -1.760∗∗∗ -1.610∗∗∗ -1.781∗∗∗
(-13.71) (-11.34) (-10.30) (-8.54) (-10.44)
Small Class 0.0591
(0.56)
Constant 3.064∗∗∗ 3.217∗∗∗
(20.62) (19.98)
Observations 3580 2357 3403 2208 3403
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Logit models; see column headings for specification
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Table 4.20: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on High School Graduation by
Gender
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Small Class 0.0115 0.0298 -0.00560
(0.72) (1.19) (-0.26)
Male -0.0954∗∗∗
(-6.89)
Black 0.0620∗ 0.0618 0.0490
(2.08) (1.36) (1.16)
Free Lunch -0.198∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
(-9.90) (-7.66) (-6.39)
Constant 0.904∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(45.27) (29.79) (34.30)
Observations 3580 1735 1845
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Linear Probability Models with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.21: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on High School Graduation by
Race
(1) (2) (3)
All Black White
Small Class 0.0115 0.0119 0.00739
(0.72) (0.37) (0.41)
Male -0.0954∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.0796∗∗∗
(-6.89) (-4.69) (-5.02)
Black 0.0620∗
(2.08)
Free Lunch -0.198∗∗∗ -0.144∗ -0.204∗∗∗
(-9.90) (-2.37) (-10.21)
Constant 0.904∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗
(45.27) (13.88) (57.28)
Observations 3580 1326 2254
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Linear Probability Models with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.22: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on High School Graduation by
Free Lunch Eligibility
(1) (2) (3)
All Eligible Ineligible
Small Class 0.0115 0.0127 0.00807
(0.72) (0.57) (0.50)
Male -0.0954∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.0409∗∗
(-6.89) (-6.27) (-2.82)
Black 0.0620∗ 0.0705 0.0113
(2.08) (1.85) (0.26)
Free Lunch -0.198∗∗∗
(-9.90)
Constant 0.904∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗
(45.27) (29.21) (82.18)
Observations 3580 2544 1036
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Linear Probability Models with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
127
Table 4.23: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on 4th Grade Noncognitive Scores
by Gender
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
(4.23) (3.03) (2.60)
Male -0.0450∗∗∗
(-5.41)
Black -0.0774∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.0610∗
(-4.45) (-4.20) (-2.31)
Free Lunch -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0862∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(-9.17) (-5.06) (-7.18)
Constant 0.617∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗
(62.27) (42.90) (49.34)
Observations 3034 1520 1514
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.24: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on 4th Grade Noncognitive Scores
by Race
(1) (2) (3)
All Black White
Small Class 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0793∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗
(4.23) (3.84) (2.91)
Male -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0376∗ -0.0480∗∗∗
(-5.41) (-2.18) (-5.00)
Black -0.0774∗∗∗
(-4.45)
Free Lunch -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0585 -0.106∗∗∗
(-9.17) (-1.74) (-8.51)
Constant 0.617∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(62.27) (13.60) (64.52)
Observations 3034 702 2332
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.25: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on 4th Grade Noncognitive Scores
by Free Lunch Eligibility
(1) (2) (3)
All Eligible Ineligible
Small Class 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0412∗∗ 0.0415∗∗
(4.23) (3.14) (2.94)
Male -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗∗ -0.0517∗∗∗
(-5.41) (-3.51) (-4.07)
Black -0.0774∗∗∗ -0.0729∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗
(-4.45) (-3.63) (-2.63)
Free Lunch -0.105∗∗∗
(-9.17)
Constant 0.617∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗
(62.27) (44.13) (65.52)
Observations 3034 1818 1216
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.26: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on 4th Grade Cognitive Scores by
Gender
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Small Class 0.0159∗ 0.0173 0.0182
(2.10) (1.55) (1.71)
Male -0.0449∗∗∗
(-6.43)
Black 0.0120 0.00662 0.0264
(0.71) (0.27) (1.09)
Free Lunch -0.0713∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗ -0.0676∗∗∗
(-7.79) (-5.47) (-5.23)
Constant 0.553∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(64.48) (45.73) (49.30)
Observations 1920 953 967
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.27: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on 4th Grade Cognitive Scores by
Race
(1) (2) (3)
All Black White
Small Class 0.0159∗ 0.0255 0.0117
(2.10) (1.57) (1.36)
Male -0.0449∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗ -0.0466∗∗∗
(-6.43) (-2.97) (-5.84)
Black 0.0120
(0.71)
Free Lunch -0.0713∗∗∗ -0.0644∗ -0.0729∗∗∗
(-7.79) (-2.30) (-7.48)
Constant 0.553∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(64.48) (20.36) (70.69)
Observations 1920 498 1422
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.28: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on 4th Grade Cognitive Scores by
Free Lunch Eligibility
(1) (2) (3)
All Eligible Ineligible
Small Class 0.0159∗ 0.0248∗ 0.00587
(2.10) (2.34) (0.53)
Male -0.0449∗∗∗ -0.0480∗∗∗ -0.0388∗∗∗
(-6.43) (-4.93) (-3.79)
Black 0.0120 0.0133 -0.0186
(0.71) (0.65) (-0.56)
Free Lunch -0.0713∗∗∗
(-7.79)
Constant 0.553∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗
(64.48) (42.65) (64.46)
Observations 1920 1099 821
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
Table 4.29:
Sample Size for Each Study
(Sample Size)
8th Grade Test Scores, .118 4,439
8th Grade Test Scores, .2 4,439
ACT Scores, .118 2,428
ACT Scores, .2 2,428
HS Graduation 3,580
Some College 10,992
College Degree 11,269
4th Grade Cog + Noncog 747
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Table 4.30: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on High School Graduation by
Gender, Conditional On Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Combined Scores 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.0821∗∗∗
(9.70) (6.49) (6.32)
Small Class -0.00199 -0.0123 0.00933
(-0.13) (-0.47) (0.46)
Male -0.0489∗∗∗
(-3.54)
Black 0.0728∗ 0.0325 0.123∗∗
(2.34) (0.65) (2.86)
Free Lunch -0.102∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.0899∗∗∗
(-5.06) (-3.85) (-3.52)
Constant 0.876∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗
(44.80) (30.54) (34.01)
Observations 2849 1302 1547
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.31: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on High School Graduation by
Race, Conditional On Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
All Black White
Combined Scores 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗
(9.70) (5.79) (7.71)
Small Class -0.00199 -0.00320 -0.0122
(-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.71)
Male -0.0489∗∗∗ -0.0822∗∗ -0.0389∗
(-3.54) (-2.91) (-2.52)
Black 0.0728∗
(2.34)
Free Lunch -0.102∗∗∗ -0.0449 -0.112∗∗∗
(-5.06) (-0.76) (-5.58)
Constant 0.876∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗
(44.80) (15.03) (56.71)
Observations 2849 1007 1842
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
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Table 4.32: The Effect of Small Class Sizes on High School Graduation by
Free Lunch Eligibility, Conditional On Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
All Eligible Ineligible
Combined Scores 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗
(9.70) (8.30) (4.14)
Small Class -0.00199 -0.00840 0.00822
(-0.13) (-0.35) (0.54)
Male -0.0489∗∗∗ -0.0686∗∗∗ -0.0218
(-3.54) (-3.35) (-1.58)
Black 0.0728∗ 0.0820 0.0181
(2.34) (1.94) (0.43)
Free Lunch -0.102∗∗∗
(-5.06)
Constant 0.876∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
(44.80) (30.09) (77.41)
Observations 2849 1888 961
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimated using OLS with School-by-Entry-Year Fixed Effects
Table 4.33:
Labor Market Benefits, Alternative Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
8th, All 8th, All 8th, Math ACT, All ACT, All ACT, Math
α=.118 α=.20 α=.118 α=.118 α=..20 α=.118
All 4,261 6,249 3,064 6,293 9,694 2,691
All-Weighted 4,609 6,515 3,503 4,452 6,248 3,222
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
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Can value-added measures be utilized to accurately assess teacher quality so
teachers can be paid according to their worth? Are certain types of teachers as-
signed certain types of students, clouding analyses that fail to account for these
differences? Do the returns to class size reduction initiatives outweigh the sub-
stantial costs? This dissertation has provided key insights into answering all three
of these questions.
The second chapter in this dissertation showed that a failure to control for the
Approaches to Learning noncognitive score introduces bias into value-added mod-
els, and that this bias is statistically significant. Such a finding is crucial to an under-
standing of whether or not econometric techniques can mitigate the bias. Now that
researchers finally know of an actual student-level characteristic that can gener-
ate bias when omitted, it will be possible to test whether or not current techniques
sufficiently eliminate the bias. Perhaps student-level fixed effects will render the
Approaches to Learning score harmless, or maybe the year-to-year variability of
noncognitive scores is random enough to ensure that teachers observed over mul-
tiple waves of students are still evaluated in an unbiased manner. Future research
must be aimed at addressing these questions
The third chapter showed that, while our existing understanding of how teachers
are matched to students is technically correct, the assignment process might be
more complicated than initially suspected. Assignment on unobservables carries
important ramifications for empirical research. Many data sets do not contain the
rich set of variables found in the ECLS-K, and so analyses of these other data
sets may be unable to account for confounding relationships. If researchers are
unable to control for the unobserved information in their model, it may be prudent
to interpret results with caution until more research can further establish exactly
how the non-random assignment of students to teachers is carried out.
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The fourth chapter demonstrated that further research is required before one
can conclude that the labor market benefits from class size reduction definitely ex-
ceed the costs. This may be an especially urgent matter, considering that many
schools have implemented class sized reduction initiatives under the assumption
that the net return is positive. It may very well be that there are additional benefits
from small classes, such as noncash benefits or reductions in crime. Before re-
searchers can go back to assuming class size reduction delivers a positive return
on investment, though, further research will have to determine whether or not that
is actually the case.
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